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When 2 or 3 Come Together 
 
Tracey L. Meares* 
Kelsi Brown Corkran** 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article investigates policies that are responsive to crime in disadvantaged, urban 
neighborhoods from a community-based context. The vehicle is an analysis of a 
community-wide prayer vigil held in Chicago in May of 1997. The vigil resulted from a 
collaboration between the Chicago Police Department and hundreds of (mostly) African-
American churches on Chicago’s West Side. Strikingly, the local police district’s 
commander facilitated the vigil. We explain the sociological and political significance of 
this collaboration by drawing upon the “Chicago School” of urban sociology and 
demonstrating theoretically and empirically the potential for the collaboration, through 
the integration of key community institutions, to promote community capacity to resist 
crime and to complete other goals and projects of residents. The article’s end addresses 
constitutional questions. If collaboration between churches and the police through 
religious activity enhances the community efficacy of poor minority neighborhoods, is 
there any way to reconcile the benefits of such activity with constitutional concerns about 
religious establishment? We focus on the extent to which African Americans have been 
able to influence this jurisprudence through litigation rather than the internal structure of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. A review of the litigation reveals the particular 
nature of the involvement of African Americans in the development of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, and it demonstrates plainly the extent to which judicial sanction of 
church-state interaction has had, and continues to have, important racial consequences. 
African Americans, through representative litigating institutions, have consistently 
recognized the disparate impact of church-state partnerships, but the Court has never 
acknowledged the non-religious implications of its Establishment Clause decisions. As a 
result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is disconnected from the realities of disparate 
impact, and that is potentially problematic for African-American communities. We 
believe excavation of the realities of disparate impact is critical in assessing the extent to 
which modern church state partnerships should be allowed or even blessed by the state. 
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When 2 or 3 Come Together 
 
Tracey L. Meares* 
Kelsi Brown Corkran** 
 
The title of this paper quotes biblical text from the Gospel of 
Matthew: “For where two or three come together in my name, there am I 
with them.”1 In May of 1997, these words were invoked as a kind of 
catchphrase by participants in a set of extraordinary undertakings 
between the Chicago Police Department and hundreds of predominantly 
African-American churches on the West Side of Chicago. This 
collaboration began with a “call to action” by the local police commander 
and culminated in a community-wide prayer vigil in which groups of ten 
stood on designated street corners and prayed to end violence in their 
neighborhoods. On that day, not just two or three, but hundreds of West 
Side church members and police officers came together in prayer for 
their community. 
 
In using this phrase as our title, we mean to do more than 
highlight its use by participants in the joint police-church venture that is 
the subject of this article. “When 2 or 3 Come Together” has sociological, 
political and constitutional significance in the context of church-police 
collaboration in poor minority communities. As a sociological matter, the 
phrase brings to mind the potential for building community capacity to 
resist crime and to complete other goals and projects of residents 
                                                 
* Max Pam Professor and Director of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, The 
University of Chicago Law School; Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation. The 
MacArthur Foundation and the Center for Studies In Race Politics and Culture at the 
University of Chicago provided funding for the Research Project, Institutional 
Integration Between the Church and the police in Chicago’s Disadvantaged 
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Mark Jolin, Marc Sanford and Mark Thiele for their hard work on the project design, 
data collection, and data analysis in the Project. I am grateful to Sam Jordan, Brian 
Rubens, and Britnee Cole for their research assistance, and I am especially appreciative 
of the comments I received during workshops at Columbia, Iowa, Yale and the 
University of Southern California Law Schools and the Woodrow Wilson School at 
Princeton University. Financial support was provided by The Arnold and Frieda Shure 
Research and Dwight P. Green Funds at the University of Chicago and the American 
Bar Foundation. 
** Law Clerk to the Honorable David S. Tatel, Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit. J.D. and M.P.P., University of Chicago; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. 
1 Matt 18:20 (New International Version translation) 
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through the integration of key community institutions. Its political 
significance flows from the connection between the deployment of this 
religious text by police and church leaders and a subsequent change in 
the perceptions of West Side of Chicago (“WSC”) residents regarding the 
legitimacy of local police in particular and local government in general. 
The constitutional significance of the phrase brings together the 
sociological and the political: If collaboration between churches and the 
police in religious activity enhances the community efficacy of poor 
minority neighborhoods, is there any way to reconcile the benefits of 
such activity with constitutional concerns about religious establishment? 
In other words, does the success of such ventures so depend on overt 
demonstrations of public religiosity that the law and norms supporting 
the concept of separation of church and state are (hopelessly?) 
transgressed?  
 
Together, these three related themes comprise the central inquiry 
of this article.  Our primary project is to investigate policies that are 
responsive to crime in a community-based context, namely that of 
disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods. Accordingly, Part one begins by 
explaining the importance of community perspective in developing a 
crime prevention strategy, discussing specifically the notion of ecological 
crime policy. We then provide a sociological framework for understanding 
the ways in which policy can engender improved community social 
structure and norms of community-based crime resistance and 
reduction. In Part two, we describe the methods of collaboration between 
predominantly African-American churches in WSC and the Chicago 
Police Department, and tie that description to the sociological theory 
canvassed in Part One. Part two then offers empirical evidence that 
provides support for the theory that the sociological benefits described in 
the previous Parts can be obtained through church-police collaborations. 
Part two concludes with an analysis of the factors that appear to be 
responsible for bringing the WSC prayer vigil into fruition. Part three 
departs from sociological theory and explores the constitutional issues 
raised by church-police collaboration. Separation of church and state is 
a firmly rooted political value in the United States, and police-sponsored 
religious activity may be inconsistent with constitutional law, or at least 
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constitutional values. Although we have no ready answer to this 
problem, we argue that a productive consideration of this issue must 
consider both the racialized context in which contemporary 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has arisen and the relationship 
between African-American churches and the political efficacy of 
marginalized African-American communities. In this vein, Part three 
explores the extent to which the interests and needs of African-American 
communities have affected, and been affected by, judicial and political 
decisions regarding church-state collaboration.  
 
I. Crime and Community Perspectives 
 
 Crime as a problem is often conceptualized at the individual level. 
“A crime” occurs when one individual victimizes another individual. 
Because we typically think about crime in individual terms, criminal law 
policy inevitably focuses on fixing the particular individuals who commit 
crime as the primary process of crime reduction. Although there are a 
few criminal laws policies that address group criminality, such as 
accomplice liability or the crime of conspiracy, these laws are still 
animated by the notion of crime as a problem of individual offenders. It 
is, however, possible to approach crime policy differently. Rather than 
focusing on what particular individuals do and aggregating up, one can 
conceive of crime problems from a community-level, or ecological, 
perspective. Ecological crime policy, in contrast to individual-level 
offender based policy, might focus on non-offenders and promote third-
party efforts to reduce opportunities for offenders to offend. Even more 
broadly, a community-based approach might seek to motivate entire 
groups of people, including potential offenders, to voluntarily abide by 
the law, rather than focusing on penalizing lawbreakers. 
 
A. Community Social Organization and Collective Efficacy 
 
 In thinking about potential ecological crime policies, it is important 
to understand what it actually means to adopt a community-based 
perspective of crime. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay pioneered the 
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study of crime through the lens of community.2 Seeking to explain their 
earlier findings that juvenile delinquency remained high in certain areas 
of central cities over time despite population turnover, they rejected 
individualistic explanations of delinquency.3 Instead, they looked to the 
processes by which law-breaking behavior could be transmitted across 
generations.4 They maintained that three structural factors—low 
economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility—led to 
the disruption of community social organization that, in turn, accounted 
for variation in crime and delinquency rates in a given area.5 Because 
Shaw and McKay believed that the capacity of a community to maintain 
social control was a function of the structural context of that community, 
they looked to the community itself as the explanatory unit. Rather than 
trying to figure out what motivated individuals to break the law, Shaw 
and McKay sought to explain why certain communities experienced high 
crime rates over time while others did not. Their methodology and focus 
on macro-level explanatory variables was a path-breaking approach at 
the time. Shaw and McKay’s contemporaries believed that associations 
between concentrations of African Americans and the foreign-born and 
crime in urban areas was due to the individual dispositions of group 
members, including genetic explanations for offending.6 Shaw and 
McKay’s theory explained why their colleagues were wrong. 
                                                 
2 See CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS: A 
STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENCY IN RELATIONSHIP TO DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (REV. ED. 1969). 
3 See id. at 315 (“It is clear from the data included in this volume that there is a direct 
relationship between conditions existing in local communities of American cities and 
differential rates of delinquents and criminals. . . . Delinquency—particularly group 
deliquency, which consitutes a preponderance of all officially recorded offenses 
committed by boys and young men—has its roots in the dynamic life of the 
community.” ). 
4 See id. at 174, 316-21. 
5 Shaw and McKay found that the relationship between structural community factors 
and deliquency was substantial. They found a a correlation of .89 between delinquency 
rates and Chicago community areas and a proxy measure for poverty—the number of 
families on relief. See SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 2 at 146-47. They found a correlation 
of .60 between deliquency and population heterogeneity (percentage of foreign-born and 
Negro heads of families). See id. at 152-55. Both of these correlations are quite strong. 
See LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, MODERN DATA ANALYSIS: A FIRST COURSE IN APPLIED STATISTICS 
481 (1990) (Table 14.5. (explaining how to interpret the strength of correlations). 
6 See ROBERT J. BURSIK & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE 
DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 25-27 (1993) (discussing scholarly 
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 Though Shaw and McKay’s theory regarding social problems in 
communities was ignored for quite some time, it has, in the last fifteen 
years or so, made a comeback. Contemporary researchers have extended 
Shaw and McKay’s work by solidifying the notion of community 
characteristics as distinct from the aggregated demographic 
characteristics of individuals who live in communities.7 For example, 
researchers have demonstrated in several studies that violence is 
associated with poverty and residential instability in neighborhoods, 
making it clear that violence is connected to neighborhood composition 
as opposed to the spatial distribution of individuals with particular 
demographic characteristics.8 Additionally, researchers have recently 
made inroads in defining those characteristics that best enable social 
control and the realization of the common values of residents—
community social organization.9 In describing the continuous nature of 
community social organization, theorists have focused on three 
processes: (1) the prevalence, strength, and interdependence of social 
networks; (2) the extent of collective supervision by neighborhood 
residents and the level of personal responsibility they assume for 
addressing neighborhood problems; and (3) the rate of resident 
participation in voluntary and formal organizations.10 Their hypothesis is 
straightforward: when the processes of community social organization 
                                                                                                                                                 
disagreement over Shaw and McKay’s findings when they were published and 
alternative explanations for high crime rates in urban areas). 
7 The research is “ecological” rather than “psychological.” A fundamental assumption of 
ecological research is that social systems exhibit structural properties that can be 
examined apart from the personal characteristics of their members. See BRIAN BERRY & 
JOHN KASARDA, CONTEMPORARY URBAN ECOLOGY 13 (1977). 
8 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: 
Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in UNDERSTANDING AND 
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 48-63 (A. Reiss and J. A. Roth eds., 1994) 
(summarizing the recent work applying social-ecological theory to explanations of the 
variation of criminal violence); Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away With Murder: 
Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1995) 
(describing how race and class segregation concentrates violent crime in poor, minority 
neighborhoods). 
9 See Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing 
Social Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 777-82 (1989) (defining community 
social organization this way); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD 
OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 20-21 (1996) (same).  
10See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 9 at 20 (offering these three characteristics); Robert J. 
Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime and Urban 
Inequality in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 45 (J. Hagan & R. Peterson eds., 1995) (same). 
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are prevalent and strong, crime and delinquency should be less 
prevalent, and vice versa.  
 
 A 1989 study written by Robert Sampson and W. Byron Groves 
very likely spurred the current revival of Shaw and McKay’s work.11 
Sampson and Groves examined the relationship between three 
components of community social organization—levels of teenage peer 
group supervision, prevalence of friendship networks, and organizational 
participation—and crime using the British Crime Surveys of 1982 and 
1984.12 They found that unsupervised teen peer groups had the largest 
overall effect on self-reported personal violence offending rates in 1982.13 
Unsupervised teen peer groups also had the largest overall effects on 
both victimization by mugging and stranger violence in 1982.14 Local 
friendship networks were substantially and negatively related to robbery, 
and organizational participation had significant inverse effects on both 
robbery and stranger violence.15 While the magnitude of the effect of 
formal organization participation was not as large as the effect of 
supervision of peer groups and friendship networks on stranger violence 
and total crime victimization, the direction of the effect clearly supported 
theoretical predictions.16 Perhaps the most important finding of the study 
was that the community organization factors tested had a much larger 
impact on crime than socioeconomic status.17 There is every reason to 
believe that these findings are extremely robust. Sampson and Groves‘s 
work recently was replicated by Lowenkamp and his colleagues using the 
1994 British Crime Survey. The replication demonstrated the strong 
mediating effect of local friendship networks, unsupervised teen peer 
groups and organizational participation on the relationship between 
                                                 
11See Sampson & Groves, supra note 9. 
12For a description of the data and methodology behind the study, see id. Note that the 
analysis in this piece potentially suffers from the problem described above as it 
attempts to characterize community-based processes through aggregated individual-
level data rather than through more direct measures of community characteristics. 
13 See id. at 792. 
14 See id. at 788-89 (tbl 3). 
15 See id. (tbl. 3). 
16 See id. (tbl. 3).  
17 See id. at 789. 
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structural characteristics of neighborhoods and crime.18 Lowenkamp and 
his colleagues also found that after controlling for social disorganization 
measures, there was no statistically significant prediction of 
victimization, confirming Sampson and Groves’ important result.19 
 
 The astute will recognize, however, that the community social 
organization processes identified by scholars do not have to be activated 
in favor of norms that support law-abiding behavior. They are simply a 
kind of infrastructure. For this reason, one of us has used the metaphor 
“norm highways” to describe these processes in other work.20 The 
metaphor helps to clarify the fact that the social infrastructure of a 
community by itself can either inhibit or support crime. Whether 
infrastructure supports a community’s efforts to resist crime will depend 
on the kinds of norms that are transmitted among individuals who live in 
a neighborhood. Like autos on an actual highway, norms can travel in 
any direction on “roads” of neighborhood social infrastructure. Thus, the 
“norm highways” of neighborhoods may facilitate crime as well as prevent 
it.21  
 
 It is not enough to point to social processes, for such processes 
may simply represent untapped potential to get things done. There is an 
important normative aspect of effective communities that must be 
considered. Ideally, communities exhibiting strong ties, high levels of 
organizational participation, and high levels of teen supervision also will 
be committed to activation of these resources for the good of the 
community. 
                                                 
18 See Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Francis T. Cullern & Travis C. Pratt, Replicating 
Sampson and Groves’s Test of Social Disorganization Theory: Revisiting a Criminological 
Classic, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 351, 366 (2003). 
19 See id. at 361. 
20 See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 669, 676 (1998); Tracey 
L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 395 (2000).  
21 Sociologist Mary Pattillo has established empirical support for the notion that tight 
social networks sometimes support criminal conduct on a community-wide basis. In 
researching Groveland, a black middle-class community in Chicago, Pattillo found that 
dense social ties “positively affect[ed] informal and formal supervision of youth . . . .But 
. . . Groveland’s dense networks similarly allow for organized criminal enterprises.” 
MARY PATTILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK 
MIDDLE CLASS 70 (1999). 
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 Researchers in the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods (“PHDCN”) have developed a concept to capture normative 
dimensions of community efforts to resist crime. The PHDCN researchers 
coined a term—“collective efficacy”—defined as the ability of 
neighborhoods to realize the common goals of residents and maintain 
effective social control.22 They found that collective efficacy explains a 
large component of the variation of violence in Chicago neighborhoods.23 
PHDCN researchers controlled for the effect of prior crime through a 
statistical technique.24 They found, even after controlling for prior 
homicide, that collective efficacy remained statistically significant and 
negatively associated with homicide.25 This correction is a critical one 
because in neighborhoods with high crime rates, residents may be 
unwilling to engage in acts of social control, and this unwillingness in 
turn facilitates criminal activity.26  
 
 To measure collective efficacy, PHDCN researchers utilized 
particularly innovative methods. Survey respondents were not asked 
about their own practices and opinions; instead, they were asked to 
assess what happened in their neighborhood. Specifically researchers 
tapped into residents’ assessments of neighborhood networks and 
practices, as well as their opinions about the extent to which people in 
the neighborhood shared the same values and trusted one another.27 In 
                                                 
22 See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbusch & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and 
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE, Aug. 15, 1997, at 918-
19. 
23 See id. at 918.  
24 See id. at 922. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 PHDCN researchers measured practices of informal social control through a five-item 
Likert-type scale. Residents were asked about the likelihood that their neighbors could 
be counted on to intervene if (1) children were skipping school and hanging out on a 
street corner, (2) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building, (3) children 
were showing disrespect to an adult, (4) a fight broke out in front of their house, and (5) 
the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts. 
 To measure indicia of neighborhood social cohesion and trust, PHDCN researchers 
asked respondents how strongly they agreed that: (1) people around here are willing to 
help their neighbors, (2) this is a close-knit neighborhood, (3) people in this 
neighborhood can be trusted, (4) people in this neighborhood generally don’t get along 
with each other, and (5) people in this neighborhood do not share the same values. The 
last two items were reverse-coded. 
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this way, the researchers were able to identify important community 
characteristics, paving the way for true ecological research. 
 
B. Building Social Capital 
 
 In communities that demonstrate the capacity to “get things done,” 
two dimensions, one structural and the other normative, work together. 
The structural dimension is captured by measures of community social 
organization, while the normative dimension is captured by measures of 
collective efficacy. These two dimensions are species of social capital. 
James Coleman has described the concept of social capital this way: 
"Social capital . . . comes about through changes in the relations among 
persons that facilitate action. . . . Just as physical capital and human 
capital facilitate productive activity; social capital does as well."28 
According to Coleman, social capital is realized through relationships.29 
In an attempt to bring more clarity to the sometimes expansively defined 
idea of social capital, Sampson, Morenoff and Earls distinguish the 
structural dimension of social capital from the normative one.30 In their 
view, community structural characteristics such as friendship networks 
and participation in community organizations are potential resources 
that a community might utilize.31 In contrast a community-wide norm of 
adult supervision of neighborhood children for the purpose of social 
control is positive goal-directed task that “activates” the resource 
potential found in friendship networks.32 
 
 To see how community structural and normative social capital 
dimensions work together, consider the social process dimensions we 
have already discussed. When adults in a community work together to 
                                                                                                                                                 
  The two measures of informal social control and social cohesion were then combined 
into one measure—collective efficacy. 
28James S. Coleman, Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. 
95, 100-01 (1988) (introducing and defining the concept of social capital and noting 
that, “a group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is 
able to accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness.”) 
29 See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL THEORY 304 (1990). 
30 See Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital: 
Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 634-36 (1999) 
31 See id. at 635. 
32 See id. 
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promote a community-wide expectation that each will supervise the 
community's children collectively, then increased supervision of youth 
peer groups should follow.33 The reason is that a community-wide 
expectation of youth supervision will not be meaningful unless 
substantial numbers of the adults in a community believe they are 
obligated to participate. One can imagine many ways of inculcating such 
a norm, but one obvious way for a community of people to encourage 
adults to engage in beneficial community-wide supervision of children is 
by threatening a social sanction for the failure to do so.34 In order for 
such a threat to be credible, however, there must be connections, or 
social networks, among adults in a community to facilitate the 
transmission of the norm from person to person. Without networks 
connecting adults, it is too easy for any one adult in the community to 
free-ride on the contributions of his neighbors without fear of sanction. 
All of this means that local friendship networks should reinforce the 
supervision of teen peer groups, which in turn leads to lower levels of 
both victimization and offending.35  
 
 Friendship networks might also create another form of social 
capital by facilitating information transmission between residents of a 
community.36 Information channels may be especially important to 
residents of crime-prone neighborhoods in central cities. Urbanization is 
almost synonymous with densely populated communities, and 
population density can be a barrier to social capital formation among 
city-dwellers. The problem for many city-dwellers is not so much that 
they have fewer acquaintances or weaker friendship networks than non-
city dwellers; rather, the problem is one of proportion. The networks that 
a city-dweller creates typically have less potential to include all of the 
individuals in a community with which a resident will come in contact. 
                                                 
33See Coleman, Social Capital, supra note 28 at 102-03 (1988) (pointing to mutuality of 
obligation as an example of social capital). See also Sampson, Morenoff & Earls, supra 
note 30 at 647 (presenting a statistical model suggesting that neighborhood residents 
more actively are involved in child supervision when others around also do so). 
34 See COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 29 at 244-45 (explaining the 
relationship between the emergence of a norm and sanctions). 
35See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 9 at 788-89 (demonstrating that supervision 
of teen peer groups is associated with lower crime rates) 
36See Coleman, Social Capital, supra note 28 at 104. 
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Put simply, high population density increases the number of strangers. 
Friendship networks make it easier for residents to identify who 
“belongs” and who does not. 
 
 Participation in formal organizations is another community 
structural factor that theoretically should reinforce the crime-reduction 
benefits of both teenage supervision and friendship networks. Local 
formal organizations provide community residents with important 
opportunities to create overlapping relationships. Overlapping 
relationships subject the residents of a community to expectations and 
obligations in multiple contexts, and these obligations and expectations 
often are transferable across different contexts. The existence of multiple, 
overlapping relationships among a community's residents has important 
implications for crime prevention.37 Friendships among neighbors that 
are reinforced through individual participation in church groups, PTAs, 
community policing organizations, and the like are very likely to increase 
supervision of teenage peer groups in a community and increase 
information transmission.    
 
 Recent empirical work refines the relationships between 
community social capital and crime reduction. Utilizing PHDCN data, 
which measures community characteristics in a more sophisticated 
fashion that the British Crime Surveys, Jeff Morenoff, Robert Sampson, 
and Stephen Raudenbush demonstrated empirically that friendship 
networks, neighborhood organizations, and participation in voluntary 
associations appear to reduce violence through the promotion of 
collective efficacy.38 The authors use sophisticated statistical models to 
disentangle the independent effects on homicide of structural dimensions 
of social capital, such as social ties, and the normative dimension of 
social capital, such as collective efficacy. In essence, the authors found 
                                                 
37See id. (explaining the concept of appropriable social organization); Marvin D. Krohn, 
The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the Explanation of Delinquent Behavior, 
33 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 581, 583 (1986) (calling this process “multiplexity” and explaining 
it this way: “if a person interacts with the same people in differing social contexts it is 
likely that his behavior in one context will be affected by his behavior in another.”)  
38See Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson, & Stephen W. Raudenbush, 
Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 
39 CRIMINOLOGY 517 (2001). 
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that dense networks alone are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain 
homicide rates; instead, networks appear to create the capacity for 
neighborhood residents to exert social control.39 The statistical models 
the authors present show that social networks are positively and 
significantly associated with collective efficacy.40 Similarly, the models 
show that organizations and voluntary organizations appear to operate 
indirectly on homicide by fostering collective efficacy.41 
 
 In order for neighborhood residents to utilize their capacity to exert 
social control, there must be a willingness on their part to activate this 
resource. The willingness to do this depends in large part on solidarity 
and mutual trust among neighbors—a trust and solidarity that is 
undermined by diverse and competing subcultures. Qualitative, 
ethnographic research best demonstrates the ways in which conflicting 
normative codes can undermine the extent to which residents of some 
communities must overcome high barriers in order to promote values 
consistent with law-abiding behavior. 
 
In two ethnographic works, Elijah Anderson compellingly recounts 
how the weakened structural fabric of an urban community called 
“Northton” accompanied the transmission of two different sets of norms 
among residents of the community.”42 Anderson describes in great detail 
the clash between “decent” values (norms associated with hard work, 
family life, the church and law-abiding behavior) held by some families in 
Northton and “street” values (norms associated with drug culture, 
unemployment, little family responsibility, and crime) held by others. A 
central theme in Anderson's story of Northton is the gradual breakdown 
of a community tradition involving the transmission of decent values by 
                                                 
39 See id. at 548-49 (fig. 4). 
40 See id at 550. 
41 See id. Compare Ruth D. Peterson, Lauren J. Krivo, & Mark A. Harris, Disadvantage 
and Neighborhood Violent Crime: Do Local Institutions Matter?, 37 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 31 (2000) (finding that recreation centers, but not libraries or retail 
establishments, have a crime-reducing impact in extremely disadvantaged areas). 
42See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY 
56-76 (1990) (describing the impact of wider economic changes on the African-American 
community in Northton and introducing the notions of “decent” and “street” 
orientations); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY VIOLENCE AND THE MORAL 
LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 35-65 (1999) (comparing “decent” families to “street” families). 
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neighborhood “old heads” to neighborhood youngsters.43 This breakdown 
accompanied the constriction of employment opportunities for the young, 
increased neighborhood transience, and increased crime.44  
 
 Anderson's ethnography of Northton reflects the predictions of 
social organization theory. As social networks in Northton weakened and 
contracted due to residential instability, unemployment, and increased 
drug use, a rival set of streetwise values flourished.45 The streetwise 
norms that Anderson describes are at once a product of affirmative 
reinforcement of lifestyles that focus on drug use and crime and the 
vacuum created by the breakdown of broad social networks. For 
example, when work in the formal labor market is not available for 
significant numbers of a community's residents, a value system among 
the jobless that affirms the pursuit of economic opportunities outside of 
the formal labor market in the informal labor market, or even the illegal 
drug economy, may arise.46 Furthermore, when social networks in a 
community are weak and disparate, it becomes more difficult for the 
community as a whole to emphasize the importance of seeking work in 
the formal labor market.  
 
 Anderson's finding that streetwise values did not completely 
overtake decent values in Northton helps us understand the functioning 
of collective efficacy in a community. While many in Northton continued 
to adhere to decent values, they still had to reckon with streetwise values 
in their daily lives since those values predominated among the youth in 
the community in public spaces.47 Of course, any time there are 
                                                 
43 See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 42 at 69-76; ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 42 
at 204-205.  
44 See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 42 at chaps. 2 & 3 (describing the relationship 
between economic changes in the Northton community and the attendant vulnerability 
of the community to crime—especially drug offenses).  
45 See id. 
46See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 9 at 66-72 (explaining 
in communities in which joblessness is prevalent, residents may internalize modes of 
behavior that are inconsistent with preference for work in the formal labor market, 
which is characterized by greater regularity in hours and consistency than informal and 
illegal labor markets). 
47 See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 42 at 98-106 (explaining how “decent” kids are 
impelled to “code-switch” and adopt “street” personas in public). 
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competing value systems in a community, it is harder to establish a 
common value set—especially one directed toward affirmative collective 
efforts to resist crime as opposed to norms that support withdrawal from 
public life. The problem is magnified, however, when the competition 
takes on a generational conflict aspect.  
 
 For example, promotion of a norm of community-wide supervision 
of teen peer groups is likely to be more effective when the level of social 
capital among adults exceeds that among teens in the community. If 
parents cannot count on one another to supervise each other's children, 
then individual parents have to counteract the norms developed by 
groups of teens—norms that may promote law-breaking behavior. 
Unfortunately, when the social capital among teens is high, which often 
is true in the communities containing street gangs, individual parents 
face a dilemma. Each parent alone has little power to counteract the 
power of the teen group. Moreover, the power of the teen group may 
make the individual parent’s task more intimidating, causing her to exert 
even less supervisory control than she otherwise would. This is, of 
course, a very general description of some of the mechanisms that 
underlie the withdrawal of Northton's “old heads” from community life.48  
 
 In her book, Black Picket Fences, Mary Pattillo’s description of 
“Groveland,” a black middle class Chicago community, stands in stark 
contrast to Anderson’s description of disadvantaged Northton. Pattillo 
provides a rich account of the multiple ways that Groveland’s residents 
exert social control over youth. For example, she recounts a local school 
council meeting in which one attendee stated, “We have to take 
responsibility for all of our children. The same children that are beating 
up on our children are also our children. They go right around the corner 
when they go home. They are our children.”49 This statement captures 
                                                 
48 For a quantitative demonstration of the dynamics described here, see Sampson, 
Morenoff & Earls, supra note 30 (finding that residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods 
have much lower expectations for shared intervention on behalf of children in public 
settings even where the level of personal ties is not affected by concentrated 
disadvantage in neighborhoods). 
49 See Pattillo, supra note 21 at 78. 
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the expression of collective efficacy through a particular institutional 
process: a school council meeting.  
 
 Pattillo goes on to describe how participants at community 
meetings of block clubs, police beats, church groups, and the chamber of 
commerce, among others, devote a great deal of time to the issue of 
youth supervision.50 Gangs and “gang-bangers” are the top concerns of 
Groveland residents.51 Strategies such as removing pay phones from the 
street, removing gang graffiti from buildings, hiring police monitors for 
playgrounds, and providing activities for at-risk youth are employed by 
the citizens in their effort to address gang issues.52 Pattillo’s description 
provides real-life examples of the processes that Sampson and his 
colleagues describe through statistics. Yet, Pattillo also demonstrates 
how strong social networks can also support “corporatized” gang 
activity.53 Pattillo explains that Chicago’s largest street gang, the “Black 
Mobsters,” had a strong presence in Groveland and dominated a 
Groveland park fieldhouse and other parts of the neighborhood,54 but she 
describes how the top “Black Mobster,” Lance, is fully integrated into the 
community.55 Lance makes sure that Groveland is clean because of his 
self-interest in protecting his family and due to the numerous activities 
of residents described above. Lance is an agent of social control in the 
neighborhood, and the residents know it. Pattillo’s ethnography 
demonstrates that in the midst of seemingly effective community social 
organization, those involved in quite serious crime can exist quite 
peacefully alongside those who abhor crime. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 See id at 79-82. 
51 See id at 80. 
52 See id. at 79-82. 
53 See Jeffery A. Fagan, Gangs, Drugs and Neighborhood Change, in GANGS IN AMERICA II, 
(R. Huff ed., 1996) 43, (describing “corporate gangs” as those gangs with elaborate 
cohesive leadership structures that exist to make money and that mimic business in 
rules and group dynamics). 
54 See Pattillo, supra note 21 at 83, 85. 
55 See id at 85-90. 
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C. Ecological Crime Policy 
 
 This review of the sociological literature affirms that crime is a 
community problem that can be usefully addressed from a community-
based perspective. For example, one of us has explained elsewhere how 
to design policing strategies in ways that promote crime preventive 
aspects of community social organization.56 Taking the community-based 
perspective seriously implies policy directed at third parties in addition to 
offenders designed to enhance the likelihood that crime rates in a 
community will be lowered. Thus, while elsewhere one of us has 
described crime policy such as reverse sting operations or anti-gang 
loitering ordinances as particularly potent mechanisms for addressing 
the community-based nature of crime, the theory outlined above makes 
clear the police, or the state more generally, likely can promote 
community social organization through more direct mechanisms—
mechanisms that create networks among individuals in a neighborhood 
or networks between key institutions. So, for example, in Chicago, one of 
the specific charges of the City of Chicago’s CAPS (Chicago Alternative 
Policing Strategy) Implementation Office is to help neighborhood 
residents start block clubs. The CAPS Office considers block clubs to be 
one of the building blocks that makes community policing work in 
Chicago. The CAPS Office believes that these groups are effective 
mechanisms for focusing the attention of community residents on area 
crime problems. But, it is also true that the block club can function as 
an institution that brings individuals together who would not otherwise 
have an incentive to interact. In this way, policy that promotes block 
clubs also promotes opportunities for networking and the establishment 
of norm highways.  
 
The next section describes the West Side Chicago prayer vigil. The 
Vigil, we will argue, helped to create a species of social capital in the form 
of connections among institutions, as distinct from individuals, that 
traditionally were not connected with one another. Connections that, we 
                                                 
56 See Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 191, 217-27 (1998) (explaining how reverse drug stings and anti-gang loitering 
ordinances potentially could support community social organization). 
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think, could be activated in support of community efforts to reduce and 
resist crime.  
II. The Chicago Prayer Vigils 
 
 In May of 1997, the first community-wide prayer vigil to end 
violence against children was held on Chicago’s impoverished West 
Side.57  The structure of the vigil was somewhat unique. The participants 
stood in groups of ten on designated corners — the same corners where 
lookouts often hawked contraband by calling out “Rocks and Blows!” — 
and prayed for peace in the community.58 Following the prayer vigil, the 
group was joined by thousands of other community residents who went 
to a large park for a “praise celebration,” which included music from a 
400-member gospel choir, food, and inspirational speeches.59 While the 
size of the event made it unique, the number of people participating in 
the day-long activities was not its most remarkable feature. What was 
remarkable about the vigil was that its key instigator was the highest-
ranking police officer of the Harrison District, Commander Claudell 
Ervin. 
 
                                                 
57 The vigil covered an approximately 15-square-mile area bordered on the North, 
Ashland, Cicero and Austin Avenues. For media accounts of the day’s events see Gary 
Marx, Cop Believes West Side Has a Prayer: Harrison Commander Uniting Thousands for 
Vigil Against Violence, CHI. TRIB. May 2, 1991, at 1; Dave Newbart, Residents Take Faith 
to the Streets for Vigil: Participants Pray for West Side Peace, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1991, at 
1. 
58 As neither of us attended the first vigil, detailed information about it was gleaned 
through numerous interviews of participants and key organizers. Initial interviews with 
key vigil participants were conducted May 22, 1997, June 11, 1997, and June 12, 
1997. Following these initial interviews we constructed a list of potential interviewed by 
reviewing sign-in sheets from the planning and evaluation meeting for the first prayer 
vigil. Additionally we distributed fliers in local churches and asked interviewees about 
others who might be interested in talking with us. Finally, we offered a small monetary 
compensation ($10) for those who agreed to an interview. Fifty-five interviews were 
conducted between 1997 and 1998. Forty-one of these represented individuals who 
represent institutions.  All interviews were conducted after promises of confidentiality 
according to Human Subject Research Regulations at the University of Chicago, so their 
names, with the exception of one from whom we obtained express permission, will not 
be revealed in this Essay. The description of the 1997 WSC prayer vigil is taken from 
these interviews. 
59See id. 
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 Commander Ervin’s involvement in the West Side prayer vigil was 
the product of a vision he had received approximately six months before 
the event. In the vision, the Commander saw community residents 
standing in groups of ten on street corners: 
The Lord blessed me in such a mighty way when he gave me visions of 
ten people on the corner. I could never understand why ten people. The 
word says where two or three are gathered, I’m in their midst. Why ten? 
But then on prayer vigil day, I see why ten. Ten makes a statement on 
that corner. Two, three people, well, you know, what you all doing? You 
all really ain’t doing nothing. But ten folks on the corner covers the whole 
corner. You got to go around them.60 
 To act on the vision, Commander Ervin sent out letters to 
hundreds of churches in the Harrison Police district containing an 
invitation to church leaders to attend a meeting at the police district 
headquarters.61 That the Commander invited church leaders to meet with 
him was not particularly noteworthy. Community policing in Chicago 
was and continues to be premised, at least in part, upon outreach to key 
neighborhood leaders,62 and churches are central to disadvantaged 
African-American communities in Chicago and elsewhere. Indeed, it is 
not a stretch to say that churches are the central institution in these 
communities. As sociologist Sandra Barnes has commented, “the historic 
Black Church has been found to be an important economic, political, 
social, and psycho-emotional buffer for African Americans . . . .”63 In light 
of the key role of churches in WSC, it made sense for Commander Ervin 
to seek out church pastors.64 In fact, interviews with key participants and 
institutional representative revealed that Ervin’s immediate predecessor, 
                                                 
60 Interview with Commander Claudell Ervin, May 22, 1997. Commander Ervin gave his 
permission to be identified in any published work associated with the WSC prayer 
vigils. 
61 Id. 
62 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 145-
46 (1997) (explaining that churches constituted a “separate analytic focus” given that 
churches were key in several of the prototype districts).  
63 Sandra L. Barnes, Priestly and Prophetic Influences on Black Church Social Services, 
51 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 202, 202 (2004). 
64 See generally, C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE 
AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990), and see text at notes 96-102, infra. 
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Commander Bolling, also had tried outreach to church leaders in the 
Harrison district. Bolling’s efforts, however, proved to be unfruitful. 
Bolling attempted to involve area church leaders in community policing 
by inviting them to attend meetings in large Baptist churches in the 
Harrison district. Bolling reasoned that as the Baptist denomination was 
the most prevalent among churches in the Harrison Police District, he 
could attract a large number of ministers by cultivating ties with the 
leaders of the most established churches. However, the only pastors who 
typically showed up to the meetings Bolling planned were the pastors of 
the host churches  
 
Commander Ervin’s strategy to attract local area ministers was 
different from Commander Bolling’s approach. Ervin invited the pastors 
from various denominations to attend a meeting at police headquarters 
as opposed to church buildings. And, interestingly, he signed the 
invitation letter with an Old Testament Scripture. In contrast to the 
poorly attended meetings convened by Commander Bolling, Ervin’s 
meetings were well-attended by area ministers. It was during these 
meetings at the Harrison District Headquarters that the police and the 
pastors collaborated to plan a prayer vigil. 
 
A. The West Side Vigil as an Example of a State-Supported Social 
Organization 
 
 The church/police collaboration that occurred in several West Side 
communities in Chicago (“WSC”)65 beginning in 1997 presented such a 
                                                 
65 WSC is comprised of seven local Chicago Community areas either in whole or in part: 
West Garfield Park, East Garfield Park, Austin, Humboldt Park, West Town, Near West 
Side, and North Lawndale. According to 2000 Census Data, the 11th District accounts 
for 2.8% of the total population of Chicago and ranks 19th among the 25 districts in 
terms of population. See Chicago Police Department—Biennial Report 1999/2000 
(2001). In 1997 there were more murders in the 11th district than any other district in 
the City—69. See Chicago Police Department Annual Report 1997 at 16 (1998). The 
same was true in 1998, 1999 and 2000. See Chicago Police Department—Annual 
Report 1998 10 (1999) (noting that in 1998 the 111th district had 71 murders, 10.1% of 
the City’s total); Chicago Police Department—Biennial Report 1999/2000 12 (2001) 
(noting that in 1999 the 11th district had 79 murders, 12.3% of the City’s total); Chicago 
Police Department—Biennial Report 1999/2000 13 (2001) (noting that in 2000 the 11th 
district had 67 murders, 10.6% of the City’s total). 
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poignant example of a state-supported community social organization 
endeavor that it prompted a study. Multi-faceted data was collected over 
two years to assess the impact of two community-wide prayer vigils 
facilitated by the police.66 The goal of the research was to explore whether 
the potential benefits of the theories of social organization and collective 
efficacy explained above could be realized on the ground. The study 
design was constructed keeping in mind that improved relations between 
churches and the police can assist residents of neighborhoods concerned 
about crime in three related, yet structurally different, ways. The first 
structural path concerns the vertical relationship between the police and 
the church. The second structural path emphasizes improvements that 
flow from tighter and more prevalent horizontal relationships among key 
community institutions. And the third path involves the individual 
relationships that neighborhood residents have with one another. This 
analysis reflects an application of Albert Hunter’s three-level schema of 
social control.67  
 
 Hunter asserts that community social control occurs at three 
levels: private, parochial and public.68 The private level is the most basic. 
The private level of social order is comprised of an individual’s family and 
friends—those with whom the person is closely connected. Social control 
is achieved informally through mechanisms such as support and mutual 
esteem at one end, and ridicule, criticism, and even ostracism at the 
other.69 The next level of social order is the parochial.70 Individuals at this 
                                                 
66 We collected data through five instruments administered between 1997 and 1999: (1) 
Two mail surveys administered in 1997 after the first prayer vigil and in 1998 after the 
second attempted to gage the level of institutional participation and the impact on 
institutional linkages because of the vigils; (2) A survey of the population of police 
officers in the Harrison district; (3) a randomized phone survey of 506 respondents from 
the WSC area; (4) 55 open-ended interviews (14 individual-level and 41 institutional-
level) designed to obtain first-person descriptions of WSC, probe attitudes toward the 
community, relevant institutions, the prayer vigil, and to get a sense of the vigil’s 
impact.  
67 See Albert Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of Crime 
and Incivility in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CITIZENSHIP 
AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORRIS JANOWITZ 
(Gerald D. Suttles & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1985). 
68 See id.  
69 See id. at 232-33.  
70 See id. at 233-34.  
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level, while connected, do not have the same sentimental attachments 
that are found at the private level.71 As a result, there is a much greater 
likelihood for the formation of important so-called “weak ties” at the 
parochial than the private level.72 Hunter points to the public level as the 
final level of social control. The public level is comprised of resources 
external to the community such as bureaucratic agencies like the police 
and other instrumentalities of government.73 The major difference 
between this level and the other two is that the public level of social 
control relies uniquely on its legitimate monopoly on coercion and force 
to produce order. Hunter describes the criminal justice system as the 
“ultimate” source of social control.74 
 
 The public level can legitimately use force to produce order; 
however, this force alone cannot produce society’s desired level of social 
control because of resource limitations and other formal constraints, 
such as constitutional law.75 Social control at the public level is produced 
through formal sanctions—the threat or actual imposition of coercion; 
therefore, compliance at this level is produced through instrumental 
means. Instrumental means of producing compliance depend upon an 
individual’s fear of sanction to produce an effect.76 If one assumes that 
people will comply with rule only if the threat of coercion is present then 
it follows that instrumental methods of social control are contingent 
upon the commitment to increasing the use of force if necessary. This 
means that instrumental means of producing compliance can be costly. 
For example, if deterrence is produced by maintaining a certain 
probability of detection of rule-breakers, then authorities must be willing 
                                                 
71 See id. at 234. 
72 These ties are “weak” because the relationship between two people weakly tied is less 
intense than the relationship between close family and friends. Mark Granovetter, who 
wrote the classic article on the topic, has shown, however, that such “weak ties” may be 
critical for job searchers. See Mark S. Granovetter¸ The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. 
SOC. 1360, 1369-73 (1973); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE 
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 319-21 (2000) (emphasizing the economic value of 
weak ties, which may be more likely to lead to job opportunities for whose strongest ties 
are within economically disadvantaged communities). 
73 See Hunter, supra note 67 at 238-39. 
74 See id. at 238. 
75 See id. at 238-39. 
76 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 21 (1990). 
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to devote resources to maintain or increase the level of police in order to 
insure meeting the requisite probability of detection.  
 
 In contrast to social control produced at the public level, social 
control produced at the private and parochial levels is produced through 
informal means and, therefore, is more likely to utilize normative rather 
than instrumental methods of compliance. Given the limitations of 
formal social control, social control often is produced informally and 
normatively at the private and parochial levels.  Individuals voluntarily 
conform to the expectations of others by internalizing community 
norms.77 In some situations the compliance produced through the 
intermeshing of the personal and parochial levels of social order looks 
much like compliance produced by the instrumental means at the public 
level—sometimes people comply because they fear informal sanctions 
imposed externally.78 However, the individual who complies for normative 
reasons does so because she feels an internal obligation to do so.79  
 
 Social networks among friends and neighbors harness personal 
knowledge and trust among family, friends, and neighbors to create 
internalized expectations of obligation to conform to social norms.80 
Thus, Hunter’s schema of private and parochial social orders 
compliments the theories of social organization and collective efficacy 
laid out above. While those theories help to explain how residents in 
neighborhood are to resist crime through informal means without always 
resorting to the police and other criminal justice entities, Hunter’s three-
level schema explains the relationship between a community’s informal 
and formal efforts to produce safety.  
 
Drawing on Hunter’s schema, we can see how improved relations 
between the police at the public level of social control and churches at 
the parochial level potentially benefit neighborhoods plagued by crime. 
Newly formed connections between churches and the police on the West 
                                                 
77 See id. at 24-26. 
78 See id. at 24, 59. 
79 See id. at 24. 
80 See text at notes 28-41, supra, on social capital building. 
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Side of Chicago could produce a new species of social capital to be 
directed toward violence control. For example, by interacting with church 
leaders and parishioners, the police likely would gain access to new 
sources of information to assist them in criminal investigations. Such 
interactions might make church leaders and parishioners more willing to 
identify offenders who victimize them, which in turn would allow the 
police to more efficiently locate offenders.81 If more offenders are located 
and arrested then the certainty of punishment increases and so does the 
level of formal deterrence. Church leaders, on the other hand, could 
parlay a stronger relationship with the police to gain better access to 
municipal government resources.  
 
 Perhaps even more interesting than the benefits that flow from 
better vertical relationships between churches and police is the way in 
which improved relations on the vertical plane between the police and 
churches can translate into stronger connections among the churches 
themselves, as we explain below. If the prayer vigil led to stronger 
connections among these key institutions Hunter’s theory suggests that 
an improved community context for social control would obtain. 
    
B. Empirical Evidence Regarding Social Structural Change in WSC 
 
1. Before the Vigil 
 
Ideally, then, linkages between parochial and public levels, 
represented in this study by churches and the police, must be prevalent 
and strong in order to promote optimum conditions for effective social 
control at the community level. Prior to the 1997 prayer vigil, the 
linkages between the police the WSC churches were quite weak. Most of 
the churches we surveyed reported only occasional contact with police.82 
                                                 
81 See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization 
In the United States, 1999 Statistical Tables, Table 103, Percent of Reasons for not 
reporting victimizations to police, by race and type of crime (indicating that some 
victims do not report victimizations to police because they believe police to be 
uninterested, inefficient or biased). 
82 In a mail survey of area churches administered shortly after the 1997 Vigil, 30 of 61 
respondents characterized their contact with police as occasional friendly contact. In 
another survey administered a year later after the 1998 Vigil, 32 of 61 respondents 
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Semi-structured interviews with church leaders reveal a more complex 
story. In addition to being only “occasional,” it would appear that the 
contact between police and churches in the area we studied could best 
be characterized as reactive—leaders called police when they needed 
them. The responses of a young associate Baptist minister, the senior 
pastor of a 300-member church in East Garfield Park, and the executive 
director of an interfaith organization are indicative: 
 
Interviewer: Okay. I want to talk about the police. How would your 
characterize your organization’s relationship, past relationship, we’re 
talking pre-vigil, with the local police? 
 
Rev. Assoc. Baptist: They don’t bother us. We don’t bother them. 
 
* * * 
 
Interviewer: How would you characterize your church’s relationship with 
the police before the prayer vigil? 
 
Pastor Community Church: We really did not have one. . . . And if we 
needed them we called them. 
 
* * * 
 
Interviewer: How would you characterize your church’s relationship with 
the police before the prayer vigil? 
 
Community Leader: I guess I would characterize it the same way I 
characterize a private citizen (inaudible), very little contact. And that’s 
about it. Very little contact. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
noted that they had occasional contact with the police. Eight-five percent of these 
respondents characterized their contact with police as “cooperative.” But, importantly, 
about 17% of respondents maintained that they had no contact at all with the police. 
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At first glance, the reactive nature of the relationship between 
churches on the one hand and police on the other in WSC might not be 
particularly remarkable. However, when one recalls that the residents of 
the Harrison Police District faced (and continue today to face) 
extraordinary crime problems, it is becomes significant that the key civil 
institution in the community made little effort to work with the primary 
governmental entity charged with addressing crime on a more proactive 
basis. Another way to make this point is to say that to the extent that 
contacts between Harrison District churches and police created a 
relationship between the two key institutions, that relationship was not 
harnessed in favor of collective efficacy.  
 
In contrast to the relationship between the churches and the 
police, there were more and prevalent linkages among WSC churches. 
However, the data reveal two features of inter-church collaboration 
suggestive of the fact that the full potential for social organization 
directed to solving community problems was not fulfilled. First, many of 
the links were intradenominational. Second, the social capital in these 
links was not being directed, as a normative matter, to the problems that 
the community rated at the top of their list—crime. 
 
In a mail survey to churches we asked church leaders to 
characterize their level of contact with organizations of: (1) the same 
religion; (2) the same religion but different denominations; and (3) 
organizations of different faiths. The following graph is an illustration of 
the relative levels of frequent contact church leaders claimed to have with 
these three different groups: 83 
 
                                                 
83 The responses to the church mail survey are not truly representative of the 
population of the area. They are, however, more representative of the actual prayer vigil 
participants. The data represented in the graph collapses the respondents from two 
waves of mail surveys.  
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 We argued above that the reactive nature of the limited 
relationships between WSC churches and the police prevented the 
groups from harnessing their relationship in favor of collective efficacy. 
Our data suggest a parallel problem existed with respect to goals for 
which the relationships among WSC churches were harnessed. 
Specifically, the data indicate that prior to the prayer vigils the networks 
among area church leaders were not primarily (or even secondarily) 
directed toward everyday problems facing the community. To the extent 
that church leaders were getting together with one another, it was rarely 
for the purpose of addressing chronic community problems such as 
crime. For the most part when area church leaders met collectively, they 
did so for the purpose of addressing traditional church business. For 
example, one interdenominational group of African American WSC 
ministers met regularly to update each other on new ministries or to 
allow new ministers to try out sermons. Occasionally the group dealt 
with civil rights issues, but they did not organize in order to deal with an 
issue of “every day” living such as crime. Here are the words of a senior 
Baptist minister: 
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The ministers and churches have always been in the forefront in 
segregation and many issues. In the past, we have responded mostly to a 
crisis. This time, the commander called us together and said we're going 
to make a change in the community because of the problems, not 
because of one particular thing that was going on. This time it brought 
together many, many people because of wanting to make a change in our 
every day living. . . . .  But this have seem to held us together because 
more than just ministers, the communities, the police department came 
together and though we had those type of movements before, not in this 
particular way, not this kind of motivation. It brought together more 
fellowship even between the churches, not just to respond to a crisis but 
communication and moving and being on the same wave length. 
 
Wes Skogan and Susan Harnett, who have completed an in-depth 
study of community policing, documented a similar phenomenon. Of the 
approximately 50 religious organizations they surveyed, fewer than 10% 
had a crime-prevention mission.84 Moreover, Lincoln and Mamiya’s 
survey of Black churches reflects our data. In their survey, of the 60% of 
respondents who participated in any ongoing projects that required 
interdenominational cooperation, only 2% (30 churches) stated that they 
cooperated with churches of other denominations on social oriented 
programs such as drug or alcohol abuse, crime, welfare, housing, etc.85 
To put this in perspective, consider Lincoln and Mamiya’s research 
demonstrating that 7.2% of those churches engaged in 
interdenominational activities participated in interracial cooperation with 
white churches. It is reasonable to assume that for the most part the 
white churches to which survey respondents referred were located 
outside the respondent church’s neighborhood.86 Thus, according to the 
most extensive survey of black church activity to date, it was more likely 
at the time of the survey for black churches to work with a church from 
another sect outside of the neighborhood as a demonstration of 
                                                 
84 See WESLEY SKOGAN & SUSAN HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 145 
(1997). 
85 See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 64 at 156. 
86 See id. 
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interracial unity than it was for the black churches to engage one 
another across denominational lines on a problem as important to local 
parishioners as crime.  
    
 2. After the Vigil 
  
To assess the potential social organization benefits (and potential 
costs) of the WSC prayer vigil, both respondents who participated in the 
Vigil and those who did not were asked questions that tapped into the 
two dimensions of social capital: structure and affect. Because we were 
particularly interested in assessing Hunter’s ideas regarding parochial 
level integration, we asked institutional leaders in WSC whether they 
formed new relationships with other institutional leaders as a result of 
participation in the vigil. Similarly, we assessed changes in affect by 
asking institutional leaders about the likelihood of harnessing new 
relationships for cooperative efforts. 
  
With respect to structure, the survey results reveal that about 50% 
of respondents stated that they have formed between one to five new 
relationships resulting from participation in the Vigil. With respect to the 
affect dimension, church leaders were asked whether their opinions 
regarding various community institutions had changed and whether they 
believed that cooperation between the leader’s own organization and 
various types of community organizations was more or less likely. The 
following two charts summarize these data. 
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How did the vigil change your opinion about . . .
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Each of these charts summarizes the newfound potential for 
greater social organization in WSC. By and large, after the vigil, church 
leaders had more positive views of other key institutions in WSC than 
prior to it. Moreover, leaders claimed an increased likelihood of 
cooperation among these institutions for the purpose of getting things 
done in the community. Additionally, church leaders stated that they felt 
better about the community’s prospects after the WSC prayer vigil. Fully 
82% of respondents believed it was more likely after the prayer vigil that 
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the community could get organized to help itself. Fifty-eight percent of 
respondents felt that after the vigil the police were more concerned about 
the well-being of the community’s children and the community itself. 
Even 39% of respondents felt that after the vigil, the city government 
would help WSC improve.87 
 
 It is important to note here that the data summaries above include 
both church leaders who participated in the prayer vigil and those that 
did not. Almost a third of our respondents did not participate in the vigil, 
yet they appear to have been influenced in a positive direction merely by 
their awareness of the event. While 80% of vigil participants reported 
feeling more positive about the police after the vigil, 50% of non 
participants claimed the same. Not one of the non participants reported 
feeling more negative about the police after the prayer vigil. Similarly, 
while vigil participants were more likely to register intense feelings about 
the likelihood of future cooperation with important community 
institutions, non participants still registered positive feelings about the 
likelihood of future cooperation.88 This finding is quite striking and 
suggests that the WSC prayer vigil had an impact on the community 
extending beyond the particular participating individuals.  
 
 The in-depth interviews help to motivate these findings—especially 
in terms of individual expectations about the community’s prospects. A 
Catholic priest summarized his feelings this way: 
 
I think the prayer vigil, number one, is a challenge to every individual 
church, organization or whatever: What are you doing? Are you doing 
anything? It’s time to get busy. It’s time to do some things. 
 
Creating expectations for action is a critical component of collective 
efficacy. The fact that institutional leaders in WSC were better connected 
                                                 
87 Note, however, that in answer to this question, 46.3% of respondents felt that it was 
no more true after the vigil that the city government would be helpful. 
88 For example, 50% of participants claimed that interdenominational cooperation was 
much more likely in the future compared to only 10% of nonparticipants, but majorities 
of both groups were positive about the likelihood of future cooperation—77% of 
participants and 53% of nonparticipants respectively. 
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after the vigil provides the structural predicate to reinforce this 
expectation, just as Hunter would predict. 
 
 The data is inadequate to allow a complete assessment of the 
extent to which these new linkages, along with rejuvenated enthusiasm 
for community control, has translated into concrete projects. But telling 
anecdotes abound. For example, researchers attended meetings of the 
interdenominational Minister’s Alliance that was formed in order to 
promote prayer vigils subsequent to the 1997 WSC prayer vigil. It was 
not uncommon to see secular service providers utilizing Alliance 
meetings as opportunities to promote their services. Post WSC prayer 
vigil meetings featured social service purveyors. At one meeting an 
organization encouraged pastors to sign up children to receive free school 
supplies. At another meeting, representatives of the CPD asked ministers 
if they would help to recruit new police officers from their congregations. 
The ministers again functioned as certification intermediaries, but this 
time, the certification was for the primary benefit of the police instead of 
for the benefit of congregants. Other meetings focused on crime policy. 
One meeting was devoted to the level of support the ministers would offer 
to the City’s original anti-gang loitering law. Another meeting was 
devoted to “SODA orders” (stay out of drug area orders), proposed 
legislation to exclude from WSC neighborhoods individuals who had been 
convicted of drug selling provided that the individual to be excluded did 
not live or work in the designated neighborhood. These examples clearly 
indicate the extent to which an improved vertical relationship between 
the police, representing the public level of social control, and the church 
leaders, representing the parochial level of social control led to an 
increased level of social capital for residents of WSC. 
 
We noted above that Hunter’s 3-level schema predicts that higher 
levels integration between the public and parochial levels could provide 
WSC church leaders with the opportunity to gain more access to 
municipal government resources. That state of affairs appears to have 
taken place in WSC post prayer vigil. Less obvious, however, was that the 
newly-formed relationship between WSC ministers and the local police 
would provide the ministers with increased political efficacy. After the 
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prayer vigil one key minister was appointed to serve on the City’s Police 
Board—the first minister to hold such a position. Another young pastor 
was appointed to a high-level position in city government related to 
community policing. Perhaps most interesting is evidence that the post 
prayer vigil relationship between WSC church leaders and the police was 
such that WSC church leaders were able to translate the relationship 
into the power to better hold the CPD accountable to the community’s 
interests. Consider the following telling case. 
 
Several months after the May 1997 prayer vigil, one young minister 
from the East Garfield Park neighborhood walked into two CPD officers 
arresting a man from the neighborhood. The man did not attend the 
young minister’s church; nonetheless, the minister decided to find out 
what was going on. The CPD officers asked the minister to step away 
from the arrest scene, which was unfolding peacefully, but the minister 
refused. The circumstances that followed were contested, but the 
conclusion of the events was clear—the minister was arrested. As the 
minister was processed at the Harrison District headquarters, 
Commander Ervin saw him and recognized him on his way out of the 
building. No doubt because of the newly formed relationship with area 
ministers, Commander Ervin asked a lieutenant, the highest ranking 
officer in the building, to see to the minister’s needs in the Commander’s 
absence. When Commander Ervin returned to headquarters to speak to 
the minister himself, he learned that the minister had already invoked 
his right to remain silent and to speak to a lawyer, so Commander Ervin 
was not allowed to talk to the young man. That evening, several of the 
ministers from the Alliance held a press conference complaining about 
racial profiling in WSC. Other ministers met in a group with the 
Commander to settle the dispute. After several meetings, the dispute was 
resolved. 
 
What is interesting about this incident is the urgency to solve the 
dispute that Commander Ervin demonstrated. After the WSC prayer vigil, 
the Commander’s relationship with the ministers was an important 
source of his legitimacy in the community. Commander Ervin depended 
upon the ministers’ favor to develop the community’s trust in him. While 
‐ 34 ‐ 
the pastors’ relationship with the Commander and the CPD was not 
critical to their position as leaders in the community, the relationship 
certainly enhanced their position in the community as heads of central 
institutions. Many of the ministers who participated in the WSC prayer 
vigil believed that their relationship with Commander enabled them to 
procure resources for the community from the CPD and from the City 
that they had not been able (or had not been as able) to procure prior to 
the establishment of a stronger vertical relationship between WSC 
churches and the police.  
 
In a sense this crisis enhanced the benefits of the relationship from 
the ministers’ perspective. Although the ministers were motivated in part 
to protect the honor of one of their own, the incident allowed the 
ministers to demonstrate to the community (and to the police) that 
collaboration with the police would not inevitably lead to their being co-
opted by the police. The police learned an important lesson as well. They 
learned that the social capital in their relationship with the ministers had 
to be tended and guarded. In other words, they learned the potential cost 
of being an agent of the community rather than vice versa. 
 
 It is not a stretch to say the WSC prayer vigil was a key event that 
motivated critical rethinking of community policing in Chicago. After the 
vigil, the City became much more interested in fostering local grassroots 
events for the benefit of community policing. Moreover, churches and 
faith-based institutions have become an even more prominent feature of 
Chicago’s CAPS strategy. In September of 2004, the City of Chicago and 
the Chicago Police Department sponsored the ‘largest gathering of faith-
based leaders to date” at McCormick Place for a day of workshops 
devoted to community economic empowerment, offender re-entry, grant 
writing, HIV and public health, responding to the hip hop generation, 
and public policy reform. 
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3. Implementing the WSC Prayer Vigil  
 
We have just presented a picture of the linkages among WSC 
churches and between the churches and the police prior to the landmark 
1997 community prayer vigil and after it. The data strongly suggests that 
important linkages have now been formed between key community 
institutions that did not exist prior to the vigil. We turn now to a critical 
question: How did this happen?  
 
As a first pass at answering this question it is useful pose a 
different query: What were the structural barriers to cooperation among 
the churches themselves? The answer to this question became clear after 
only a small number of interviews with church leaders. The governance 
structure of the predominantly Protestant local churches in WSC, while 
facilitating democratic participation by members, created collective 
action problems for coordination among the leadership of individual 
churches.  
 
One hurdle to coordination among WSC churches was their wide 
diversity of denominations and faith traditions. Our survey respondents 
were a mix of church leaders from 15 different Protestant denominations 
including, but not limited to, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, A.M.E, 
Catholic, Christian Disciples of Christ, Baptist, Church of Christ, Church 
of God in Christ, Christian Reformed, Non-Denominational, and 
Independent. To refer to these many denominations as simply, 
“Protestant,” belies the variation among them in terms of faith practice 
norms, liturgy and training of the pastors themselves. Once we add to 
this mix the fact that there were survey respondents representing the 
Catholic Church and the Seventh-Day Adventists, few would be 
surprised to learn that there is distrust among ministers of various 
denominations and religious practices. Tellingly, Meares interviewed at 
least one Protestant minister who responded that he had had contact 
with church leaders of a different faith—Catholic priests.89  
                                                 
89 The historical antagonism between Catholics and some Protestants, especially 
evangelical Protestants, has a long history in the United States. See, e.g., ROBERT 
WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD 
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Denominational cleavages in WSC are supported by demographic 
differences between sects. There is, of course, a great deal of 
demographic variation among congregations within denominations, but it 
is also true that denominations are known to have distinctly different 
demographic characteristics. For example, in their landmark study of 
Black Churches, Lincoln and Mamiya found that traditionally black 
Methodists tend to come from the middle-income bracket, while the 
majority of Pentecostal Church of God In Christ (COGIC) members are 
working class or working poor.90 Baptist churches represent the largest 
chunk of churched African Americans and reflect a diversity of social 
classes,91 while a 1993 study of African American Catholics indicates 
that they have higher median incomes than individuals with any other 
typical African American religious affiliation—exceeding the median 
income of Baptists by almost $4,000.92 These income differences likely 
accompany variation in educational attainment, occupational 
achievement, and the like among members of the various sects. Church 
organization leaders often serve different, but overlapping, parts of the 
WSC community. They therefore are located in various social networks 
and operate within different spheres of influence. All of these factors 
present barriers to communication among church members and church 
leaders. Yet, the same factors portend a great yield in terms of social 
capital should the church leaders manage to overcome barriers. Obvious 
benefits of increased contact among individuals from different 
denominations include an increase in access by the more disadvantaged 
individuals to jobs, opportunities, and life expectations.93 
 
A second hurdle to coordination among WSC churches was 
individual, as opposed to institutional, in nature. WSC churches by and 
                                                                                                                                                 
WAR II 72-76 (1988). I did not get the sense that the Protestant minister whom I 
interviewed held animus against Catholics; rather, he just had not worked with many 
Catholics—proving my point here. 
90 See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 64 at 172 (1990).  
91 See id. 
92 See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD (1993). 
93 Compare WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1987) (explaining that concentrated disadvantage 
results in social isolation, “a lack of contact or of sustained interaction with individuals 
and institutions that represent mainstream society.”) 
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large are denominations in which the minister serves at the pleasure of 
his congregation.94 As such, the pastors of these churches must attract 
congregants for support. Interviews with church leaders revealed that 
simple competition among WSC ministers for congregants who could 
contribute to the collection plate played a large role in keeping the 
ministers from working with one another.  
 
Commander Ervin was identified in interview after interview as the 
individual who could address the various barriers to communication 
among WSC church leaders. 
 
A Methodist minister had this to say: 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that all of the churches would have got 
together and had an event like the prayer vigil if the police had not been 
involved? 
Methodist Minister: It would have taken a leader of someone to bring 
them together and I don't see anyone in the West Side area that could 
have gotten all of the churches involved as they did. 
Interviewer: Why? Why is that? When you say you don't see – 
 
Methodist Minister: Because of denominational barriers. Seventh Day 
Adventist would not have come out if I had started it. The Baptist would 
not have come out if the Seventh Day Adventist had started it. The 
Catholics would not have come out if the Baptist had started it. So it 
took an outside interest that could draw all of them together. 
 
                                                 
94 Lincoln and Mamiya document that in 1989, 38,800 churches were organized under 
the National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., the National Baptist Convention of America, 
or the Progressive National Baptist Convention. See LINCOLN AND MAMIYA, supra note 64 
at 31, 35, and 37 (documenting the number of churches in the three denominations in 
1989). This represents 64% of the churches of traditionally African American 
denominations. African American Methodist (AME) and Pentecostal denominations 
make up the remainder. See id. at 54, 58, 64, and 84 (documenting the number of 
churches in three AME denominations and the number in the Church of God in Christ 
(COGIC) denomination). Lincoln and Mamiya note that Baptist ministers are not 
appointed to a church by a higher ecclesiastical authority.  See id. at 42. Churches 
belonging to the COGIC denomination, while not as free-standing as Baptist churches, 
tend to exercise considerable autonomy. See id. at 84-88.  
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A Baptist minister agreed: 
 
Baptist minister: . . . I'm involved in another project where we are 
actually trying to pull together the leadership from the seven major black 
denominations. And we've been at this thing several months, and it's not 
happening. It is not happening at all. And it's always scheduling, 
scheduling. No, you know. Sometimes persons may be more inclined to 
participate in something that is called together by a body other than a 
denomination, you know. Yeah. Probably participation of ministers would 
not have occurred on the scale that it did had it been had I called or 
something like that. 
 
And here are the comments of a CDC officer on the same point: 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that, you know, assuming that a church had the 
resources to do it, do you think that they could have pulled it off? 
CDC Officer: No. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
CDC Officer: Because like any other groups of people in the world there are 
factions. There are the Baptists, there are the Catholics, there are the Lutheran, 
there are the Protestant, there are the everybody. And each group has a central 
figure that they look up to. For instance, there's a contingent of pastors who 
look up to Reverend (inaudible) because he has been there for years and he 
knows and he has the wisdom, and so they follow him. Younger pastors 
(inaudible), they follow him. Reverend X over on President Street, he's another 
very powerful minister. He has a contingent of pastors who follow him and adore 
him and look to him for wisdom. You would have had to bring all of those 
factions together. Now, those are power bases with those ministers. And this 
minister does not get along with that minister, and that minister doesn't get 
along with that minister, and this faction is not cooperating because this 
minister says no. So I think the commander as the central point of power in 
many ways was able to bring the factions together. That's where he came in. He 
went to this pastor who had this group and said, listen, we really need to pray, 
we need to bring everybody together and we need to, you know, do this on one 
accord, and I want to work with you and I want to work with Reverend 
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(inaudible), I want to work with this one, I want to work with that one. And 
(inaudible) that came together. 
 
Note, however, that in promoting the WSC prayer vigil, 
Commander Ervin had to overcome more than the significant 
communication barriers among the participating churches. He also had 
to overcome the skepticism of police of WSC residents born of the 
traditionally antagonistic relationship between the churches and the 
police in Chicago’s African American neighborhoods. Highlighting these 
two hurdles suggests that a simple request by a high-ranking local police 
leader of the churches to work together would be inadequate to motivate 
the churches to work with the police or with each other. There is 
additional evidence to buttress this conclusion. As we noted earlier, 
Commander Ervin’s predecessor, Commander Bolling, reached out to 
WSC church leaders with little success. However, Commander Bolling’s 
approach didn’t work. Why not? 
 
The answer is that it took a combination of individual religious 
outreach from a position of organizational neutrality. To achieve higher 
levels of collaboration between the police and church leaders it was 
necessary for Commander Ervin to meet the pastors on their terms. Not 
surprisingly, operating on the ministers’ terms meant speaking from a 
religious standpoint. In 26 of the 40 institutional-level interviews, 
respondents emphasized the Commander’s religiosity. His spirituality 
was important to vigil participants—they repeatedly drew attention to it 
as they explained why his efforts met with success.  
 
Highly-churched95 WSC residents were attracted to Commander 
Ervin’s spirituality. Respondents tended to discuss the Commander’s 
spirituality in two ways, though several cited both as important. In the 
first category were those who described the Commander as a deeply 
                                                 
95 Our randomized phone survey shows that 75% of WSC residents reported attending 
church. Approximately 50% reported attending church weekly, and 90% reported 
attending at least once a month. But see C, Kirk Hadaway, Penny Long Marder, & Mark 
Chaves, What the Polls Don’t Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church Attendance, 58 AM. 
SOC. REV. 741 (1993) (demonstrating that church attendance rates for Protestants and 
Catholics, are, in fact, approximately one-half generally accepted levels). 
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religious man whose spirituality was a force to be reckoned with. The 
second category of respondents referred to the commander as a Christian 
or as churched—descriptions which mean largely the same thing in 
WSC. These individuals suggested that the Commander’s success was at 
least partially the result of his religious affiliation. 
 
Both of these aspects of religiosity were important to gain the trust 
of WSC ministers. The effectiveness of the Commander’s strategy can be 
seen in the interview responses. The young associate Baptist minister 
referred to above suggested that the Commander’s religiosity helped 
overcome the objections of those who distrust the police. He said: 
 
First, they didn’t want to be a part of it because it was a police 
commander. It was the police, to long it up, it was the police. But then 
after seeing he was truly a man of God - proved himself for the most part 
- then they came on board and got involved in it, and word of mouth 
went around and other people started coming out.  
 
Another WSC community leader put it this way: 
 
I don't believe it was really organized by the police. I believe it was 
organized by a Christian who happened to be a policeman. And that's a 
world of difference.”  
 
To understand the appeal of Commander Ervin’s persona as a man 
of faith to the many religious leaders interviewed during this study, a 
deeper understanding of the central role of the churches to the many 
African American residents of WSC is helpful. Domestic and 
transnational polls have long supported the fact that “American blacks 
are, by some measures, the most religious people in the world.”96 
Compared to white Americans, African Americans attend church more 
frequently, participate in other church-related affairs more often, and 
                                                 
96 GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE’S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE 90’S 
122 (1989). 
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belong to more church-affiliated organizations.97  Our randomized 
telephone survey of WSC residents is in accord with this research. Eighty 
percent of the African American respondents mentioned attending 
church at least once a month—the modal response was weekly—
compared to 43% of white respondents.98 In addition to registering a 
connection with church institutions, African Americans are more likely 
than other groups to say that God is important in their lives.99 Even 
African Americans who are not current church members or who do not 
regularly attend church report praying daily in high numbers.100 Based 
on this, the special resonance that religious references and church 
culture have for many African Americans, WSC residents included, is not 
very surprising. Church culture provides a blueprint for neighborhood 
activities, whether explicitly religious in nature or not.  Familiar music 
and hymns, catchphrases of encouragement (“Amen!’ “Say it, brother!”), 
a preacher-like tone and delivery of a message, a commonly used 
scriptural references, are not, for many African Americans, shibboleths of 
their faith; rather, they are parts of a cultural tool kit to which broad and 
                                                 
97 See Christopher G. Ellison & Darren Sherkat, The “Semi-Voluntary Institution” 
Revisisted: Regional Variations in Church Participation among Black Americans, 73 
SOCIAL FORCES 1415, 1415 (1995). 
98 The following chart provides more texture and detail regarding WSC church 
attendance. This chart does not include those who identified themselves as Hispanic, 
Mexican, Asian or as belonging to some other ethnic group. 
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99 See, GEORGE GALLUP, JR. RELIGION IN AMERICA (1996). 
100 See Robert Joseph Taylor, Correlates of Religious Non-Involvement among Black 
Americans, 30 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 126, 132 (1988). Only 18% of those African 
Americans surveyed who never attend church or who have no church affiliation report 
never praying at all. 
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diverse—at least within the community—groups have access. Mary 
Pattillo sums it up this way: 
 
The power of prayer, Christian imagery, and call-and-
response interaction lies not only in the possibility of 
realizing concrete results from particular supplications, but 
also in the cultural familiarity of these tools among African 
Americans as media for interacting, conducting a meeting, 
holding a rally, or getting out the vote. Black church culture 
constitutes a common language that motivates social 
action.101 
 
In her work, Pattillo recounts numerous incidents in which participants of 
secular meetings probably unthinkingly incorporated religious activities and 
references simply because that was the “way to do things.” 
 
 In Commander Ervin’s case, however, it was not business as usual. For 
Ervin, the decision to choose from among the church cultural menu as 
opposed to the police secular one was deliberate and meaningful. His audience 
understood his decision in that way, and took it to heart. This is not to say that 
Ervin shed his identity as a police officer in making the choice to use church 
culture as a strategy of action to bring churches closer to the police, as a 
community development corporation officer astutely recognized. This officer 
downplayed the fact that the Commander was ‘churched’ and emphasized that 
the Commander was a man of faith who also wielded power as a civic servant: 
 
CDC officer: Well, he is involved in a church, but his central point of power was 
the fact he's a spiritual man. And he is a police commander, okay. Now, if it had 
been Police Office Ava Columbus102 it wouldn't have worked even still because 
they would not have looked to her for leadership. They would not have come 
together voice. They came together because he's the commander of this district, 
and he employs 350 police officers (inaudible) at will. And that's his power. 
The interviewer: Okay. 
                                                 
101 Mary Pattillo, Church Culture as a Strategy of Action in the Black Community, 63 AM. 
SOC. REV. 767, 768 (1998). 
102 A pseudonym. 
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CDC officer: So [community leaders] would respect that. 
 
So far, we have emphasized Commander Ervin’s role in bringing 
the many (mostly African American) churches into a closer relationship 
with the Chicago Police Department. However, we want emphasize that 
he was also critical to facilitating the creation of more linkages among 
the churches themselves. In light of Hunter’s theory of social control, this 
aspect of the prayer vigil might have be the more important result of the 
WSC prayer vigil—especially given that the community prayer vigil was 
spectacularly interdenominational. Interestingly, while it would appear 
that the Commander’s access to church culture was probably the most 
important factor that motivated individual church leaders to come to the 
table with him as a police officer, we believe that it was the Commander’s 
blue uniform and stripes—his role as a police officer and agent of the 
state—that helped him to bring the interdenominational group to sit with 
each other. 
 
As an agent of the state, Commander Ervin was able to take on an 
official position of neutrality that most of the participants recognized. In 
his role as a public official, he was able to serve as a mediator among the 
members of the interdenominational group so that all of the church 
leaders could sit down together at the table. Commander Ervin’s persona 
as a state actor offered a different benefit of neutrality. He was able to 
bring the pastors together not only because he did not represent any 
particular denomination, but also because he was not a pastor himself. 
This was critical in a world in which church leaders are in competition 
with one another for congregants. As a police officer with no church 
congregation of his own, Commander Ervin presented little threat to 
WSC ministers despite the fact that he organized a high-profile religious 
event. Without his own church, Commander Ervin was unlikely to draw 
congregants away from any of the WSC ministers’ churches—a practice 
referred to as “sheep-stealing.” Illustrative are the comments of three 
pastors: an elderly Baptist minister of a storefront church; the pastor of a 
non-denominational and interracial church, and a Catholic regional 
officer of a national interdenominational religious organization: 
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Elderly minister: Well, it looks like most of your ministers that he want 
to do something himself instead of being, you know, unified. You know, 
together we stand and divided we fall. . . . . [L]ook, sometime it’s jealousy, 
you know. Some of them want to be their own churches and then when 
he get a little ahead, then he won’t help the guy that, you know. 
*  *  * 
 
Interviewer: Well actually—let me ask you this. Do you think that the 
churches could have come up with this idea? That this would have—if 
Commander Ervin hadn't been there that the vigil would have -- 
Rev. Non denominational: No. No. I don't think so. And that's because I 
think, because I think the churches mirror sort of the larger society and 
then there's all kinds of competition among us, distrust among churches, 
and it's real petty stuff. I mean I (inaudible) membership kind of stuff, 
and so in this sense you needed somebody outside the neighborhood. 
 
* * * 
 
Interviewer: But you were saying, and let me just make sure I 
understand this, that [a particular minister] could have the vision or 
maybe he has the right attitude, but it sounds as if -- 
Religious Organization Leaders: There would be competition. There 
would be ego problems. 
Interviewer: But people don't perceive the commander to be in 
competition with them? 
Religious Organization Leaders: No. He's not a pastor of a church 
 
Given these dynamics, it should now be clear why Commander 
Ervin was successful in making connections to churches and 
subsequently creating a cohesive interdenominational group, while his 
predecessor, Commander Douglas Bolling, was not.  Commander Ervin 
deployed religious language to invite the ministers to work with him, but 
he conducted meetings at the police headquarters—neutral state turf. 
Commander Bolling, in contrast, invited the ministers to the table with 
the neutral language of the state, but held meetings at particular 
churches—typically Baptist. It is not surprising that he failed.  
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While we have just explained the effect of the Commander’s 
religiosity and his role as a police officer as serving distinct roles—i.e., 
religiosity being the critical factor to insure that ministers came to meet 
with the Commander, and state neutrality being the key to bringing 
disparate groups together—in reality these two facets worked together to 
reinforce one another. So, for example, it wasn’t just the fact that the 
Commander used religious language to invite the ministers to come 
together that made the strategy effective. It was the fact that it was a 
police officer using religious language that intrigued the ministers and 
made them come out. In the ministers’ experience police officers didn’t 
use religious language in their official capacity, and they certainly didn’t 
propose prayer vigils on corners. The ministers also likely had their own 
folklore regarding constitutional constraints on state actors that helped 
to contribute to the power of the Commander’s invitation.103 In short, the 
ministers’ understanding of the Commander’s role in the WSC prayer 
vigil was that he was doing something that he was not supposed to do. 
As such, his actions were interpreted by his audience as being costly to 
him, and because his actions were so interpreted, the ministers did not 
doubt his sincerity. By engaging in conduct that could subject him to 
stringent criticism by his superiors, the Commander was able to signal to 
the ministers that he was trustworthy.104 The Commander’s signal, in 
turn, enabled the ministers to confer legitimacy on him (and by extension 
the CPD—at least to a certain extent). In effect, the ministers acted as 
                                                 
103 This point did not come out directly in any of the interviews with the ministers. In 
fact, only individuals affiliated with the police or municipal government even mentioned 
the constitution or concerns about it. Elsewhere one of us has suggested that even 
those line officers who supported the WSC prayer vigil and believed it to be consistent 
with ideas of community policing might still believe that police officers should 
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internalized, yet unarticulated constitutional norms. See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for 
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1626-29 (2002). Similarly, WSC ministers 
likely have a body of assumptions about the law, or “legal consciousness,” that informs 
their ability to assess the credibility of government actors such as Commander Ervin. 
See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes 
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1059 (2000) (explaining that legal consciousness refers as much to how people do not 
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104 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) (explaining a model of 
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rather than “bad” types). 
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certification intermediaries. They “vouched” for the police leader, who 
formerly held a position of distrust. 
   
III. The Prayer Vigil and the Constitution 
 
 The data we have reviewed here suggest that, unlikely as it might 
seem at first glance, activities such as the WSC prayer vigil can 
contribute to a community context that promotes opportunities for 
community residents to work together to achieve higher levels of safety 
and general efficacy in their neighborhoods. Because of these features, 
the WSC prayer vigil could be characterized as a particularly innovative 
example of community policing. It is also undeniably true that the 
collaboration between the Chicago Police Department and WSC ministers 
described here implicates the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution—specifically the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause.105 
 
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any “law 
regarding the establishment of religion.”  In the landmark case, Everson 
v. Board of Education,106 the Supreme Court offered a resounding 
interpretation of this language, declaring that the First Amendment 
requires “a wall of separation between church and state” that “must be 
kept high and impregnable.” More specifically, the majority asserted, 
public funds cannot be used “to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion.”107 
 
 In the fifty-eight years since Everson, the Supreme Court has 
decided over fifty cases under the Establishment Clause.108 To assert 
that this long line of cases has been the subject of criticism is an 
                                                 
105 U.S. Const. Amend I. The First Amendment also prohibits laws that “interfere with 
the free exercise of religion,” but this portion of the Religion Clause is for the most part 
not relevant to the purposes of this paper. 
106 330 US 1 (1947). 
107 Id. at 16, 18. 
108 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 287-88 (2001). 
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understatement. Although there have been many attempts to identify an 
internal logic in the Court’s line of reasoning, judges and legal scholars 
have been able to glean only general principles that are difficult to apply 
in all but the most extreme cases of government support to religion.109 
Our goal here is not to puzzle through the internal structure of the 
Court’s opinions to assess the relevance of the Establishment Clause to 
the WSC Prayer Vigil. We will instead focus on the extent to which 
African Americans have been able to influence Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, and the ways that that jurisprudence has influenced 
them. A review of the litigation reveals the particular nature of the 
involvement of African Americans in the development of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, and it demonstrates plainly the extent to which 
judicial sanction of church-state interaction has had, and continues to 
have, important racial consequences.  
    
African Americans, through representative litigating institutions, 
have consistently recognized the disparate impact of church-state 
partnerships, but the Court has never acknowledged the non-religious 
implications of its Establishment Clause decisions. As a result, there is a 
disconnect between Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the 
realities of disparate impact that is potentially problematic for African-
American communities. We believe excavation of the realities of disparate 
impact is critical in assessing the extent to which modern church state 
partnerships should be allowed or even blessed by the state. To that end, 
we begin with a quick tour of Establishment Clauses cases relevant to 
the welfare of African Americans—cases involving schools and cases 
involving social service delivery.  
 
A. Government Aid to Religious Schools 
 
 Everson v. Board of Education is a landmark case not only because 
it marks the beginning of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the 
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002); Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of 
American Religious Liberty: From Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain 
Future, 75 IND. L. J. 1 (2000).  
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but also because it is the first Supreme Court decision on public aid to 
religious schools. At the time of that decision, the vast majority of private 
religious schools were Catholic, and many scholars have argued that 
Everson and the school aid cases that followed over the next thirty years 
were fueled to a large extent by anti-Catholic sentiment.110 For the 
Protestant majority and a growing number of liberal intellectuals, the 
Catholic Church represented “an authoritarian force that threatened 
reasoned inquiry, democratic politics, and social unity.”111  
 
In the African-American community, parochial school aid was 
significant not as an issue of church-state relations or anti-Catholic 
bigotry, but because of its implications for school desegregation. The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education112 was met with 
massive resistance, and many southern states prepared to avoid 
desegregation by closing public schools altogether and using state 
vouchers to fund all-white private schools.113 Although the Supreme 
Court soon made it clear that closing public schools was not an option, 
the number of private, segregationist academies increased dramatically 
in the 1960s. In particular, the Court’s rejection of freedom-of-choice and 
its endorsement of busing114 “triggered a massive exodus of whites from 
public schools and a scramble to find private alternatives.”115 Many of 
these new schools were Christian academies, established by white 
churches. The leaders of these churches were explicit about their 
motives. One Baptist pastor stated frankly that he “would never have 
dreamed of starting a school, hadn’t it been for busing.” Another 
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acknowledged that parents enrolled their children in Christian schools 
“because they just don’t like blacks.”116  
 
 It was thus not surprising when the NAACP called on the black 
community to oppose school aid; as one prominent minister observed, 
religious schools were about to “succeed in carrying out a de facto form 
of racial segregation with federal funds.”117 Recognizing that threat, the 
New York NAACP’s president announced in 1967, “We are against aid in 
any way, shape or form, because it only helps those who would skirt 
legislation on desegregation.”118 In 1970, the Pennsylvania NAACP 
succeeded in bringing Lemon v. Kurtzman119 before the Supreme Court, a 
case that would set the standard for impermissible school aid and 
become one of the most important Establishment Clause rulings in 
American history. 
 
1. Religious School Aid and the Desegregation Battle: Lemon v. 
Kurtzman  
 
 Alton Lemon was an African-American father whose children 
attended public school in Pennsylvania. In conjunction with the NAACP, 
he brought a two-fold challenge against recently enacted legislation that 
used taxes to subsidize the cost of teacher’s salaries, textbooks, and 
teaching materials in private schools. First, Lemon alleged that the effect 
of the Nonpublic Schools Act would be “to encourage, promulgate and 
perpetuate de facto segregation, to the detriment of the education 
received by his and other black children in the public schools.”120 As a 
result, Lemon claimed, the funding scheme violated his equal protection 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Lemon asserted that 
because 96% of the private schools eligible for aid were religiously 
affiliated, the Act constituted an establishment of religion and was 
impermissible under the First Amendment.  
                                                 
116 Id. at 334. 
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118 Id. at 159. 
119 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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 Lemon’s opponents did not challenge his assertion that the Act 
would perpetuate segregation. Instead, they argued that Lemon lacked 
standing to bring an equal protection claim because his children had not 
been denied admission to any of the nonpublic schools that were 
positioned to benefit from the Act. (In fact, Lemon had not sought to 
enroll his children in any of these schools.) Kurtzman’s brief was devoted 
almost entirely to Lemon’s First Amendment challenge.121  
 
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lemon on the basis of his 
Establishment Clause challenge. In doing so, the Court identified a 
three-pronged test for permissible statutory law under the Establishment 
Clause: the statute must have a secular purpose, its primary effect must 
not be the advancement or inhibition of religion, and it must not foster 
excessive government entanglement with religion. Pennsylvania’s 
Nonpublic School Act violated the entanglement prong of this test.122 
Although Lemon and the NAACP both dedicated significant portions of 
their briefs to the issue of segregation, the Court addressed their equal 
protection challenge only in a footnote, stating that the Establishment 
Clause ruling in the case “makes it unnecessary for us to reach this 
issue.”123 Still, it is unlikely that the racial implications of the ruling went 
unnoticed by the Court.124 
 
 The interest of the NAACP and African Americans in opposing aid 
to private schools that enabled whites to avoid desegregation is obvious. 
It is less clear that school aid in itself undermined the black community. 
Lemon and the NAACP both argued vehemently that the provision of 
public money to religious schools involved impermissible aid to religion 
under the First Amendment. Although the non-Catholic church-related 
schools at that time were “virtually 100 percent white,” the Catholic 
parochial school system served 10,000 black students in the city of 
                                                 
121 See Brief for Appellees Kurtzman and Sloan, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971) (No. 89). 
122 403 U.S. at 612-14. 
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Philadelphia alone.125 There were thus a significant number of black 
families that stood to benefit from the Nonpublic School Act. However, as 
Lemon emphasized, the vast majority of black children in the parochial 
school system attended schools that were over 85% black. The 
overarching issue for Lemon and the NAACP was racial segregation. 
Lemon observed, “To its great credit the Philadelphia Archdiocese 
supports and maintains fifteen black ghetto schools for black children . . 
. but this is not integration.”126 There is no evidence that Lemon or the 
NAACP had any vested interest in the Establishment Clause challenge 
other than its potential usefulness in obtaining the desired outcome in 
the case.  
 
2. Shifting Tides in the Black Community: Aguilar v. Felton 
 
 The tension between racial segregation and public funding of 
religious schools has continued since Lemon was decided. As the battle 
for school desegregation wore on during the 1970s, so did the Supreme 
Court’s attack on religious school aid. By 1980, the Court had struck 
down tuition reimbursement for low-income children,127 maintenance 
and repair assistance for schools serving low-income families,128 
reimbursement for standardized testing expenses,129 provision of school 
services and education equipment,130 and funding for instructional 
materials and field trips.131 In 1985, the Court hit the high water mark of 
its “No Aid” position132 with its back-to-back rulings in Grand Rapids v. 
Ball133 and Aguilar v. Felton.134 We will focus on Aguilar here. 
 
 Aguilar involved a challenge to a publicly funded program that 
provided remedial assistance to low-income children with educational 
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need, regardless of whether they attended public or private school. One 
result of this program was that public school teachers were providing 
services to children on the premises of religiously affiliated schools. While 
there is no reference to the issue of segregation in the parties’ briefs or 
the Court’s opinion,135 Aguilar marks an important turning point in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for African Americans: it is the first 
time that a significant contingent of the black community had reason to 
support public aid to religious schools. This schism continued to grow in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, as black families grew frustrated with the 
dismal quality of urban public schools and wanted other options for their 
children. Indeed, there is solid evidence that black students at parochial 
schools perform significantly better than their public school counterparts 
and are much more likely to graduate from high school and attend 
college.136 Programs that provide publicly funded vouchers for religious 
schools began to receive substantial support from the black community, 
with 72% of black parents favoring voucher programs in a 1997 poll.137 
 
3. Shifting Tides in the Supreme Court: Agostini v. Felton 
 
 As the landscape of religious school aid and its implications for 
African Americans changed, so did the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Court shifted its 
position on public aid to religious institutions, requiring only that the 
government “be neutral in its allocation of funds” rather than “support 
only secular activities.”138 After five justices suggested in a 1994 opinion 
that it might be time to overrule Aguilar,139 fifteen parochial school 
parents, mostly single working mothers, brought New York’s remedial 
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education program back before the Court in Agostini v. Felton.140 Only 
one of the briefs in the case mentioned the issue of racial segregation 
and, interestingly, it did so in support of the school aid program. The 
amicus brief argued that publicly funded remedial education in religious 
schools increased the choices open to low-income parents and cited 
evidence that school choice was “being used to combat racial 
segregation” and had “become the preferred approach to desegregation in 
districts throughout the country.”141 The parochial school parents did 
not make race an issue in their argument, but did emphasize that all of 
the children who benefited from the program were “economically and 
educationally disadvantaged” and that the government’s intent was only 
to “improve the lot” of such children.142 For many people, the litigation 
symbolized a battle between poor, working parents who merely wanted 
quality education for their children, and white elites whose opposition to 
school aid was purely philosophical. To no one’s surprise, the Court 
sided with the parents, overruling both their assumption in Aguilar that 
teachers on religious school premises were likely to teach religion and 
their conclusion in Grand Rapids that any educational aid to religious 
schools necessarily creates an impermissible “symbolic union” between 
church and state. 
 
 Not all African Americans sided with the parents in Agostini. As the 
Supreme Court continued to relax its stand on religious aid in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the issue of religious school vouchers became 
increasingly controversial in the black community. Black school choice 
proponents formed an unlikely alliance with conservative white 
evangelicals, arguing that publicly funded tuition assistance for religious 
schools would provide low-income families with a desperately needed 
alternative to failing urban public schools.143 Other African Americans 
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argued that religious school aid would only benefit a small minority of 
poor black students and that the majority would be left behind in rapidly 
deteriorating public schools that lacked the money necessary to improve 
their performance. In 2002, this tension surfaced full force in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris.144 
 
4. The Voucher Battle: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
 
 Zelman involved a taxpayer challenge to the Ohio Pilot Scholarship 
Program, which provided private school tuition aid for certain low-income 
children in the Cleveland City School District. The taxpayers argued that 
because 96% of the participating students attended religiously affiliated 
schools, the program had the impermissible effect of advancing 
religion.145  
 
The respondents, not surprisingly, denied the First Amendment 
charge, but they also introduced a novel argument into the school aid 
debate: Even if the voucher program did advance religion, it should be 
upheld on the ground that “the improvement it will bring to the 
education of African-American students now attending Cleveland’s public 
schools outweighs Establishment Clause concerns.”146 This claim was 
supported in an amicus brief by a newly formed pro-voucher organization 
entitled the Black Alliance for Educational Options. In the brief, BAEO 
described itself as a non-profit, intergenerational organization 
“committed to improving the educational opportunities available to 
minority and low-income children.”147 Although the summary of 
argument stated that the “case was not about religion, but about 
educational policy,” most of the brief concerns the Establishment Clause 
issue. BAEO argued that the voucher program did not have the primary 
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effect of advancing religion and that it was administered in a religiously 
neutral fashion. Only at the end of the brief did BAEO return to the issue 
of educational opportunity, citing numerous studies about the success of 
vouchers in failing school systems. They concluded that invalidating the 
Cleveland program “would force thousands of economically 
disadvantaged children to return to the substandard conditions of 
Cleveland’s inner-city public schools.”148 
 
The NAACP did not agree. In an amicus brief supporting the 
taxpayers, the NAACP argued that the tuition assistance program raised 
“grave dangers of . . . fostering the resegregation of schooling in 
Cleveland.”149 As evidence, they pointed out that whites were 
participating in the voucher program at a disproportionate rate compared 
to number of white students in the school district. The brief makes no 
argument with regard to the Establishment Clause challenge, concluding 
only that the “Court should act to prevent the establishment of separate 
private, predominantly white educational systems and public, 
predominantly minority educational systems by rejecting” the Petitioner’s 
argument.150 
 
Zelman sparked intense conflict in the black community about the 
desirability of school choice. Although the legal basis for the litigation 
was the Establishment Clause, the debate surrounding the case had 
nothing to do with religion or church-state relations. Nonetheless, as in 
Lemon, the Supreme Court completely ignored the racial and class-based 
implication of Cleveland’s tuition assistance program and based their 
decision exclusively on the First Amendment. In a 5-4 ruling, the justices 
held that the program was “entirely neutral with respect to religion” and 
did not offend the Establishment Clause.      
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5. The Continuing School Aid Debate in the Black Community 
 
 As one writer observed, “Strange days indeed, when the NAACP’s . . 
. opponents are black school children singing ‘We Shall Overcome’ on the 
courthouse steps.”151 Tuition assistance for nonpublic schools has 
become increasingly popular in cities throughout the country, and the 
black community remains divided about the impact of such programs. In 
reflecting on the history of religious school aid rulings in the context of 
the African-American community, the most interesting observation is 
that the actual issue of religious establishment has been entirely 
ancillary to the issue of racial segregation and educational opportunity. 
Although shifts in Establishment Clause jurisprudence have, for the 
most part, paralleled shifts in the impact of religious school aid on black 
schoolchildren, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged the racial 
consequences of its school aid rulings. As a result, there is a severe 
disconnect between the internal logic of the Court’s opinions and 
external influences and implications of the litigation leading up to those 
opinions. Zelman raises an important question: Can benefits for a 
historically disadvantaged population outweigh religious establishment 
concerns in determining the constitutional validity of a school aid 
program? By focusing the Zelman opinion exclusively on the 
Establishment Clause challenge, the Court left this question 
unanswered. 
 
B. Faith-Based Social Services 
 
 The use of public money to fund private social services has a long 
history in the United States; as early as 1898, New York City distributed 
57% of its money for relief of the poor to private agencies.152 Throughout 
this history, churches and religious organizations have been at the 
forefront in providing social services, with “religiously motivated persons 
[typically] . . . the first into areas of societal need.”153 As government 
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contracting with nonprofit agencies increased dramatically over the past 
40 years, so did the amount of public money going to churches and 
religious organizations. Each year, billions of tax dollars are funneled 
through religiously affiliated programs for the provision of health care, 
foster care, drug and mental health treatment, job training, child care, 
and a host of other social services.154 The New York Roman Catholic 
archdiocese alone receives $1.75 billion annually in government funds.155 
Although some of these services are provided in a secular manner, many 
of the churches and religious nonprofits that receive public funds 
continue to incorporate religious doctrine and faith-based practices into 
their services. A recent study by Stephen Monsma found that among 
religiously based child service agencies, 71% have religious symbols or 
pictures in their facilities; 64% have spoken prayers at meals; 70% have 
“informal references to religious ideas by staff with clients”; 35% have 
required religious activities; and 33% “encourage religious commitments” 
by clients.156 As Monsma observes, “One of the best kept-secrets in the 
United States is that when it comes to public money and religious 
nonprofit organizations, sacred and secular mix.”157 
 
1. The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Social Services: 
Bowen v, Kendrick 
 
 Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence includes only one 
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of providing public funds 
for social services by religious entities. Decided in 1988, Bowen v, 
Kendrick158 involved a challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act, which 
provided federal grants to public and private organizations for the 
purpose of providing services relating to teenage sexual activity and 
pregnancy. Because religious organizations were included among 
grantees, the plaintiffs argued that the Act constituted an impermissible 
establishment of religion. The Supreme Court rejected this challenge, 
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holding that “direct government aid to religiously affiliated institutions 
[does] not have the primary effect of advancing religion.”159 Although the 
plaintiffs also argued that the program created “an unacceptable risk” 
that the grant money would be used to promote religion, the majority 
disagreed, stating “we refus[e] to presume that the [grant] would be used 
in a way that would have the primary effect of advancing religion.”160 
 
 Although Bowen specifically states that social service providers 
may only use public money for secular purposes, its rejection of the 
plaintiffs’ “unacceptable risk” argument had the practical effect of 
making it extremely difficult to win broad-based Establishment Clause 
challenges to government grant programs. Instead, a plaintiff must 
litigate on a grant-by-grant basis and show that specific grant recipients 
are using public money to promote religion.161 This aspect of Bowen 
explains why there has been so little litigation regarding religious activity 
by government-funded social service providers: it is simply not worth the 
effort for the ACLU or other separation watchdogs to litigate against 
specific grants to specific religious organizations. The most important 
exception to this non-litigation pattern is Wilder v. Bernstein,162 a faith-
based social service case decided by the Second Circuit in 1988. 
 
2. Faith-Based Social Services and Disparate Racial Impact: 
Wilder v. Bernstein 
 
 Wilder was the culmination of a series of lawsuits challenging the 
New York City Department of Social Service’s pervasive use of sectarian 
foster care agencies and its practice of placing children in agencies 
affiliated with the same religious denomination as the child’s legal 
parent(s). Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, Shirley 
Wilder, a black, Protestant foster child, complained that the provision of 
state funds to sectarian agencies and the Department’s religious-
                                                 
159 Id. at 609. 
160 Id. at 612. 
161 See MCCONNELL, supra note 132, at 600. 
162 848 F2.d 1338 (2d. Cir. 1988). 
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matching scheme violated the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 
 
 With regard to the establishment claim, Wilder argued that the 
Department’s practice of providing public funds to sectarian agencies 
impermissibly advanced religion and involved the favoring of some 
religions over others and over nonreligion. Although the free exercise 
claim is outside the scope of this article, the equal protection claim is 
interesting because, like Lemon in his challenge to parochial school aid, 
Wilder argued that the church-state partnership at issue resulted in 
discrimination against blacks and other minorities. In New York City, the 
best foster care facilities were overwhelmingly Jewish and Catholic-run. 
Because the statutory scheme gave Jewish and Catholic children first 
rights to placement with these agencies, Protestant children were, on the 
basis of their religion, sent to inferior Protestant, secular, or public 
facilities. Wilder asserted that these placements were racially 
discriminatory because white children were more likely to be Catholic 
and Jewish, and black children were more likely to be Protestant. As a 
result, “black children waited longer than white children for placement; 
and black children were more often and in numbers disproportionate to 
white children placed with agencies of inferior quality.”163     
 
  The first district court to consider Wilder’s claims conceded that 
the Department’s practices did violate “the literal language of the 
Establishment Clause,” but held that this infringement was justified by 
two legitimate state interests: the right of legal parents to determine the 
religious upbringing of their children, and the right of foster children to 
free exercise of religion.164 The three-judge court concluded that the 
statutes and practices at issue represented “a fair and reasonable 
accommodation” between the establishment and free exercise clauses of 
the First Amendment. When a new complaint was filed five years later 
                                                 
163 Martin Guggenheim, State-Supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the 
Prohibition Establishing Religion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: 
Wilder v. Bernstein, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 603, 621 (1990). 
164 Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1024 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). See also 
Guggenheim, supra note 163,at 615-16. 
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(essentially continuing the original lawsuit),165 the new district court 
judge came to the same conclusion, balancing Establishment Clause 
concerns with “other equally important provisions of the Constitution.”166  
 
 As in the school-aid cases, the racial discrimination charges fell by 
the wayside. In the first round of litigation, the district court explicitly 
limited its inquiry to the Establishment Clause challenge, declining to 
consider Wilder’s equal protection claim. Eventually, the parties entered 
into a settlement agreement that required the Department of Human 
Services to ensure that black, Protestant children had equal access to 
the best facilities by implementing a “first come, first serve” policy when 
demand for a particular placement exceeded availability. The last round 
of Wilder litigation was instigated by sectarian agencies that objected to 
the settlement and argued, among other things, that the “first come, first 
serve” policy was a race-conscious remedy without empirical 
justification. The district court and Second Circuit both rejected this 
argument, not because they found sufficient evidence to justify a race-
conscious remedy, but because they concluded that the “first come, first 
serve” policy was not race-conscious.167 Thus, at no point in the entire 
litigation did any of the courts consider whether New York City’s practice 
of religious-matching in foster care placements actually violated the 
equal protection rights of black children. The cases were decided entirely 
on the basis of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. As in the 
school-aid cases, the judiciary acted as if the only issue presented was 
one of church and state and ignored the racial undertones and 
implications of the litigation.   
 
C. WSC and the Constitution 
 
 The preceding review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
makes clear that the African American struggle for civil rights has 
intersected in important ways with the Court’s development of ideas 
                                                 
165 See Guggenheim, supra note 163 at 621. 
166 385 F. Supp. at 1029. 
167 See Wilder, 848 F.2d at 1345; Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1320-22 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1986).  
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regarding the separation of church and state. The review also highlights 
the extent to which African Americans, or at least key African American 
political institutions, have conceptualized the community’s interests in 
the Establishment Clause. For the most part, the litigation pattern 
suggests that the African American community’s interest in the 
Establishment Clause has been very instrumental—a legal vehicle used 
to achieve a higher end such as desegregation. And, desegregation, while 
clearly pursued for its own moral value, also had instrumental value to 
those litigating cases like Lemon. African Americans hoped that their 
children would have access to high quality education through 
desegregation. One can easily see this last point by looking to more 
recent cases such as Zelman. There Establishment Clause concerns, at 
least for some African American litigants, took a backseat to an interest 
in educational quality, which the litigants hoped to achieve through a 
more liberal voucher policy. Note that even the NAACP, who supported 
the taxpayers claiming that Ohio’s program violated the Establishment 
Clause, did not press a First Amendment argument. The NAACP, 
opposed the voucher plan out of a concern that the program would 
reestablish segregated public schools. 
 
In light of the centrality of church-like norms, religious language, 
and other social practices readily flowing from the towering institutions 
of African American cultural life, the lack of concern about, or at least 
attention to, the potential dangers that outsiders see regarding close 
church-state relationships exhibited by representative African American 
institutions is perhaps not surprising. Indeed the central role of 
churches in African American communities help explains not only 
Commander Ervin’s success in facilitating the WSC prayer vigils, but also 
the seemingly inconsistent litigation positions of the NAACP in Lemon on 
the one hand, and the BAEO and NAACP in Zelman on the other. In no 
case did the kinds of “traditional” Establishment Clause concerns 
identified by the Everson Court ever loom large for these groups. Given 
that one could make the argument that the groups of people most 
affected by a particular policy (African American public schools students 
in Ohio, residents of high crime neighborhoods in Chicago) are less 
troubled by potential constitutional problems than less impacted 
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outsiders, should one conclude that collaborations between the state and 
the church like the WSC prayer vigil should be sanctioned?168 
 
It would be ironic, to say the least, to conclude that activities such 
as the WSC prayer vigil should be prohibited given that the community-
based problems to be remedied on Chicago’s West Side have a particular 
history. That history is one of political exclusion and marginalization—
marginalization that made it difficult for community members of the past 
to acquire the resources necessary to avert the kinds of processes that 
Shaw and McKay argue lead to crime. In that atmosphere, African 
American residents of urban disadvantaged neighborhoods created their 
own civil institutions—the church being one—the deal with community-
based problems. It is natural, then, that residents would turn to this 
venerable institution when taking the beginning steps to reestablish (or 
establish) working relationships with political and government actors. 
And it would be sad—perhaps even an outrage—to use the Constitution 
to prevent residents of impoverished communities from drawing on this 
longstanding source of civic strength and power. 
 
The Zelman litigants in their brief offer a framework for thinking 
about the WSC prayer vigil in its proper historical context. They proposed 
a balancing test. That is, they argued that even if Cleveland’s voucher 
program violated the Establishment Clause on its face, it should be 
upheld on the ground that “the improvement it will bring to the 
education of African-American students . . . outweighs Establishment 
Clause concerns.”    This approach is attractive because it breaks down 
the somewhat artificial lack of balancing in the First Amendment religion 
cases. The most problematic element of the current Lemon test is that, at 
least facially, it is a purely formal inquiry: whether or not a state action 
constitutes religious establishment has nothing to do with the context in 
which the action takes place. Although the historical development of 
                                                 
168 Compare Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of ) Order in the 
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC. REV. 805, 830-32 (1998) (arguing that it is important that 
courts, when considering the constitutionality of crime policy consider the views of 
those most affected by the policy and according this group more weight than the views 
of outsiders). 
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establishment clause jurisprudence strongly suggests that the justices 
are swayed by the circumstances surrounding challenged activity, the 
Court’s reasoning is always expressed as if it takes place in a vacuum, 
inconsiderate of the extra-religious impact of its decisions. This could be 
precisely why it is so difficult to identify an internal logic in the Court’s 
opinions; they fail to articulate the true scope of the Lemon inquiry, 
which necessarily involves some balancing of competing state interests. 
Constitutional balancing outside of the Establishment Clause context is 
widespread. The Court has acknowledged the role of interest-weighing in 
almost every other area of constitutional law, including freedom of 
speech,169 substantive due process,170 procedural due process,171 equal 
protection,172 separation of powers,173 privileges and immunities,174 
dormant federal commerce power,175 and even free religious exercise.176 
Why not here? The balancing approach to religious establishment 
eliminates the need for artificial formalistic debate over church-state 
interactions and provides a platform for examining the empirical 
questions that currently divide the black community: Does parochial 
school aid hurt disadvantaged students? Is the provision of federally 
funded social services by black churches good for black communities? 
Can church-police partnerships improve the safety of poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods? Under current establishment jurisprudence, these 
inquiries are irrelevant. In reality, they are often the heart of the matter.  
 
In fact, one way to look at the litigation path we described above is 
to say that African American litigants in establishment cases have 
implicitly made a balancing argument since Lemon. While it could be 
coincidental that establishment jurisprudence has, in so many ways, 
paralleled the interests of African Americans, it appears that the 
                                                 
169 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
170 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
171 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
172 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 
(1977). 
173 See, e.g., Community Futures Trading Commi’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 
(1986). 
174 See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985). 
175 See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How) 299 (1851).  
176 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);  
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Supreme Court has not been immune to the racial implications of its 
establishment decisions. The problem here is that the explicit 
identification of race as a factor under the Lemon test could constitute 
impermissible racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 
This might explain the reluctance of the Court to recognize the racial 
implications of its decisions—allowing Cleveland’s voucher program to 
continue solely on the basis of its benefit to black children would put the 
Court on very dangerous ground.177 However, it is certainly permissible 
for the state to undertake efforts to improve the quality of life in poverty-
stricken neighborhoods; as the Court held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,178 
wealth is not a suspect classification. A church-state partnership in a 
poor, black neighborhood might be justified not because the community 
is black, but because the centrality of the church in that community 
creates a situation in which the most efficient and effective way for the 
government to serve that community is through its religious institutions. 
The Equal Protection Clause impacts the ways in which black litigants 
can frame their contextual arguments, but it does not prevent courts 
from considering the unique role of faith-based institutions in black 
communities. Moreover, even in cases bringing race-based Equal 
Protection challenges, courts have been willing to give special leeway to 
police and public safety arguments.179  
 
 
                                                 
177 If it is true that the Court has not been immune to the racial implications of its 
decisions in the Establishment Clause cases, even without mentioning race, then it 
wouldn’t be the first time in the Court’s history. See Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. 
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-1159 (1998) 
(noting that nearly all the landmark criminal procedure cases arose in a context in 
which the Supreme Court fashioned its decisions in response to institutionalized racism 
without being very forthcoming about this fact and drawing comparison to modern free 
speech jurisprudence). 
178 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
179 See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the City’s 
testing program allowing African American police officers to be promoted before whites 
with better raw test scores because the city had a 'compelling state interest' in a racially 
balanced police force and because the program was 'narrowly tailored' to the problem 
and citing, Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002) (asserting that 
courts have left open small windows for discrimination when the discrimination is 
supported by compelling public safety issues, such as police department effectiveness); 
Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir 1981) (also allowing race-based 
promotion of police officers). 
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IV. Conclusion: Churches, Police and Constitutional Norms 
 
While the doctrine erected around the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses is the antithesis of clarity, the basic purposes of those Clauses 
are fairly straightforward. Thus, courts have worried about government’s 
excessive interference with or promotion of religion to insure that no 
individual is forced by the state to undertake a religious practice that he 
or she does not want to, or forced to believe in a deity at all thereby 
assuring the “fullest scope of religious liberty and tolerance.”180 This idea 
has led to judicial tests to seek out coercion and endorsement.181 We 
have suggested that the concerns of those tests in the context of the WSC 
prayer vigils may be at worst misplaced or, at best, unhelpful, because of 
cultural norms and practices of the relevant neighborhood residents. But 
there is additional goal of the First Amendment Religion Clauses that is 
very relevant to the events that took place in WSC, and, indeed relevant 
to the social process that we seek to promote here. Specifically, another 
goal of the Religion Clauses is to “avoid that divisiveness based upon 
religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government 
and religion alike.”182 One reason why social processes in WSC were not 
activated in ways that brought the greatest potential for crime reduction 
and prevention was because there was conflict among the community’s 
important institutions based, at least in part, on religion. However, 
Justice Breyer’s presumed strategy of greater secularization to quiet the 
conflict is unlikely to succeed in WSC where church culture is so 
prominent. Instead, a different route, one that at once promotes a 
religious approach to dealing with community leaders and official state-
based neutrality appeared to be the prescription—a prescription in many 
ways in accord with the goal underlying the Religion Clauses themselves. 
 
Vigilance is still in order, however. The very success of the Vigils 
and the ensuing accretion of political power of the WSC ministers in 
                                                 
180 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963). 
181 See Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating an 
endorsement test); Lee v Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(advocating a coercion test). 
182 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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municipal government possibly may lead to a concern for the relative 
power of other religious groups in WSC. As long as all religious groups 
have equal access to municipal resources, then there is little reason to 
worry, but to the extent that there is evidence that one sect is favored 
over another, or even shut out altogether (i.e., is the Nation of Islam at 
the table?), then one might rightly wonder whether endorsement and 
coercion ought to play more of a role in regulating the local activities in 
WSC. Where would that regulation come from? We end with a cautionary 
tale, the story of Kiryas Joel.183 
 
Kiryas Joel Village is a community of ultra-orthodox Hasidic Jews 
located 50 miles northwest of New York City. Following the Holocaust, 
surviving members of the Satmar Hasidic sect relocated from Europe to 
the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. By 1975, the Satmar 
community had grown too large for its forty square block enclave in 
Brooklyn, and decided to purchase 320 acres of land in Monroe, New 
York. A zoning dispute soon arose with the township, leading the 
Satmars to incorporate their land as the Village of Kiryas Joel in 1977. 
The village now has over 12,000 residents, all of whom are members of 
the Satmar Hasidic sect. Children make up well over half of the 
population. 
 
 The Kiryas Joel community is devoutly religious and maintains a 
lifestyle that bears little resemblance to that of mainstream society. They 
interpret the Torah strictly and speak Yiddish as their primary language. 
Men and women are segregated outside the home and wear 
unconventional clothes that include head coverings and special garments 
for boys and modest dresses for girls. Television, radio, and English-
language publications are prohibited. Children are educated at private, 
sex-segregated religious schools, where boys receive extensive training in 
the Talmud and girls are prepared for their roles as wives and mothers. 
 
                                                 
183 The details of the following story can be found in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel 
Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
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While the two parochial schools in Kiryas Joel were intended to 
serve the entire community, they did not have the resources necessary to 
provide special education services to children with disabilities. Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, these children were entitled 
to adequate special education even though they were enrolled in private 
schools. Thus, the challenge facing New York State and the Monroe-
Woodbury Central School District (in which the village was located) was 
how to provide special education services to the handicapped children of 
Kiryas Joel. 
 
The New York legislature determined that this situation constituted 
an educational crisis, and decided that special education services should 
be offered within the community of Kiryas Joel. With the support of the 
Monroe-Woodbury school district and the village, the legislature enacted 
a special statute that established Kiryas Joel as “a separate school 
district” that would “have and enjoy all powers and duties of a union free 
school district under the provisions of the education law.” The statute 
empowered a locally elected school board to open and close schools, hire 
teachers, prescribe textbooks, and establish disciplinary rules. Governor 
Cuomo called the new law “a good faith effort to solve the unique 
problem” of educating the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel. 
 
Only one public school was opened by the new district, a special 
education school that served about 40 full-time students and 160 part-
time students. Non-handicapped children in Kiryas Joel continued to 
attend parochial school and used the new school district only for 
transportation, remedial education, and health and welfare services. (If a 
non-handicapped child had requested public education, the district 
would have paid tuition to send the child to another school district 
nearby.) Neighboring school districts made arrangements to send their 
handicapped Hasidic children to the Kiryas Joel public school; two-thirds 
of the full-time students were from outside the village. Despite the 
religious nature of the village, the Kiryas Joel public school was wholly 
secular, with non-Satmar teachers and staff, co-education of boys and 
girls, and a secular curriculum. The superintendent hired to manage the 
district, Dr. Steven Bernando, was not a member of the Satmar 
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community. Although some members of an ultraconservative wing of the 
community felt the presence of the secular school violated the Torah, 
most residents of the village were pleased with the new arrangement, as 
were neighboring school districts and state officials. 
 
Despite the satisfaction of the involved parties with the statute, a 
number of taxpayers opposed the new school district. A lawsuit was filed 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute that created the Kiryas 
Joel Village School District. In 1994, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the statute did indeed involve impermissible entanglement of 
church and state and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.184 In response, eleven days later, the New York legislature 
passed a new statute, Chapter 241, that was intended to provide a 
religion-neutral mechanism for re-establishing the Kiryas Joel school 
district. The new law allowed all qualifying municipalities to “organize a 
new union free school district . . . consisting of the entire territory of 
such municipality, whenever the educational interests of the community 
require it.” A seceding district was required to have at least 2,000 
children and surpass the state average in wealth, although its secession 
could not adverse affect the larger district. In addition, chapter 241 only 
applied to cities, towns and villages in existence on an effective date. 
Kiryas Joel quickly applied to re-establish its school district, and the 
Monroe-Woodbury Board of Education voted unanimously to approve the 
secession. Thus, the Kiryas Joel Village School District was re-
established within weeks of the Supreme Court decision.  
 
However, Chapter 241 was also challenged by taxpayers, on the 
grounds that it singled out Kiryas Joel for special treatment and thereby 
involved impermissible governmental endorsement of the Satmar 
religious community. Indeed, Kiryas Joel was the only municipality in 
New York that qualified for secession under the new law. In 1997, the 
New York Court of Appeals agreed and struck down Chapter 241 as 
unconstitutional.185 
                                                 
184 See Grumet, 512 U.S. 687. 
185 Grumet v. Cuomo, 681 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1997). 
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A few months later, the New York legislature tried again, enacting 
Chapter 390, which still allowed Kiryas Joel Village to create their own 
school district but under broader guidelines. Governor Pataki estimated 
that ten municipalities qualified under the new the law, later revising 
that number to six. Opponents claimed the law applied to only two towns 
and filed suit challenging its constitutionality. Although the school 
district won the first round of litigation, the New York Court of Appeals 
reversed in 1999, concluding again that the law violated the 
Establishment Clause because it involved special treatment of a religious 
community.186  
 
This time, the New York legislature was prepared: two months 
earlier, they had passed a fourth law that would allow the re-
establishment of the Kiryas Joel school district but which expanding the 
criteria for secession even further. The new statute was broad enough to 
cover 29 municipalities in New York. Kiryas Joel Village was again 
approved as a separate school district, and although opponents 
threatened to sue for a fourth time, it does not appear that a lawsuit was 
ever filed. 
 
The Kiryas Joel Village School District exists today, operating one 
special education school that employs 24 teachers and serves 179 
students. In 1999-2000, per pupil expenditure was $74,048 (almost 
seven times the average expenditure per pupil in New York state public 
schools). Dr. Bernando still serves as superintendent and the school 
continues to be wholly secular in its management and curriculum. Thus, 
despite fifteen years of litigation and four different formal policies, special 
education services are now provided to Kiryas Joel children in the same 
way originally envisioned by the state legislature when they first 
undertook the issue in 1985.187 
 
                                                 
186 Grumet v. Pataki, 720 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 1999) 
187 See University of the State of New York, The New York State School Report Card for 
Kiryas Joel Village School in Kiryas Joel Village Union Free School District (2002), 
available at http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/ repcrd2002/overview/441202020001.pdf. 
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On the one hand the story of Kiryas Joel can be seen as a success 
story. The Kiryas Joel “problem” arose because a Supreme Court ruling 
forced Monroe-Woodbury to close their special education site at the 
parochial school in Kiryas Joel. Underlying these rulings was a 
fundamental value judgment by the Supreme Court about what the 
relationship between church and state should look like in a good society. 
In this context, the Kiryas Joel statute can be seen as the New York 
legislature’s response; that is, the statute represents the legislature’s 
judgment about what constitutes an appropriate relationship between a 
state government and a religious community such as Kiryas Joel. While 
the legislature could not challenge the decisions already made by the 
Court, it did have the ability to enter uncharted legal territory in an 
attempt to preserve whatever flexibility they could in their dealings with 
religious groups. This volleying is partly a struggle over power, but it is 
also driven by judgments about the value of church-state relationships. 
The taxpayers’ decision to challenge the statute also represented a 
judgment about the value of state cooperation and accommodation of 
religious groups, namely a belief that the Kiryas Joel statute represented 
an undesirable endorsement of a particular religion by the government. 
The story has a successful ending because the children received the 
services that they needed, and the challengers, presumably, decided that 
the legislature’s design providing for the services met their requirements 
(or, at least was not worth complaining about). 
 
The story of Kiryas Joel suggests that a successful outcome could 
be reached should the events in WSC be subject to challenge. And, such 
a challenge might generate a productive volleying that could check some 
of the more negative outcomes we worried about above. But suppose 
there is no litigation. No one has ever discussed bringing the City of 
Chicago into court over the WSC prayer vigils. Is this a good thing? 
Perhaps it is not. Without litigation, it is not clear what check exists to 
insure that unconstitutional excesses don’t take place. The state 
legislatures of New York were tenacious in the face of multiple taxpayer 
challenges, but there is no guarantee that Chicago’s municipal officials 
would exert such energy. Without legislative or executive pushback 
against challengers, the volleying we saw in Kiryas Joel is not generated, 
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and there is no guarantee of a positive outcome. In such a world, 
perhaps the absence of litigation is a good thing for the West Side of 
Chicago. 
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